The recent transformation of Europe’s security architecture has reemphasized the traditional security dimension in Turkish-European relations. The European security and defense architecture is facing one of the most significant turning points and challenges of the post-Cold War European geopolitical order.
There are three critical triggers for Europe’s historical turning point. The first is the ongoing war in Ukraine and the continuing uncertainty about where and how the Russian-European tensions will play out. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine brought the possibility of conventional war, which had been off the European agenda for some time, back to the forefront and showed that the geopolitical order based on intra-European cohesion could be shattered.
Another issue that crystallized the historical turning point was the Trump administration’s policy of minimizing U.S. commitments to European defense. U.S. President Donald Trump’s skeptical approach toward NATO and his desire to reach an agreement with Russia at all costs led Europe to question the credibility of the United States. It reinforced the perception that it was alone in its own defense. Trump's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin was a tangible development that solidified Europeans’ concerns. The EU gave a strong signal that it could consider rapprochement with Russia despite the war and the Russian threat to Europe.
The third important dynamic that triggered the historic turning point is Europe’s internal discord and fragmented defense industry architecture and eco-system. At a time when the U.S. has weakened its pro-European position, and the Russian threat is active, Europe seems far from having a holistic definition of the common threat. Structural weaknesses in the Defense Technological Industrial Base (DTIB), a fragmented defense eco-system, insufficient public defense investment and limited financial resources are the main challenges for the European defense industry in creating an autonomous system of its own.
While the ReArm Europe Plan seeks to address these shortcomings, Europe faces serious challenges in building its new security and defense architecture. Many European countries reduced their defense spending after the Cold War, leading to outdated equipment, depleted stockpiles and a lack of readiness for modern conflicts. In addition, the fragmentation of the European defense industry due to inefficient procurement processes, duplication of efforts and slow response to growing security demands remain challenges for the ReArm Europe Plan. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has further exposed critical weaknesses, including severe shortages of ammunition and equipment, as well as slow supply chains that hinder rapid mobilization.
The ReArm Europe Plan initiative was launched to address these weaknesses by increasing defense spending, improving coordination between EU countries and strengthening Europe’s defense industrial base to ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy, but the program is unlikely to make Europe militarily ready to face short-term threats.
As a result, Europe is not only at a historical crossroads but also facing a geopolitical challenge that could disrupt intra-European harmony. Against this backdrop, the search for a new model for Türkiye’s role in Europe’s security and defense architecture seems to have led to the search for a new model.
Lack of consensus on Türkiye
While there is a general acceptance of Türkiye’s growing strategic importance, there does not seem to be a consensus within Europe on integrating Türkiye into the emerging security and defense architecture. The European Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS), announced in March 2024, shows that Türkiye can be explicitly excluded. Announced in 2017, The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the area of security and defense policy, which seems vital for European security architecture, similarly offers a framework that excludes Türkiye. The European Parliament’s White Paper on the future of European defense, dated March 12, 2025, also excludes Türkiye from Europe’s security and defense architecture and even criticizes it over issues such as Cyprus.
It is not only the dynamics of the EU’s institutional mechanisms that limit Türkiye’s inclusion in Europe’s security and defense architecture. Countries such as France and Germany are also known to have a more negative approach toward Türkiye’s inclusion. France sees Türkiye as a geopolitical rival rather than a partner. Conversely, Germany is skeptical about Türkiye and is not in favor of consolidating Türkiye’s position within Europe. The positions of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus also seem to facilitate the creation of an area of resistance to Türkiye’s inclusion in the institutional mechanisms of the new security and defense architecture.
The more positive approach towards Türkiye is the position of European countries that prefer bilateral or multilateral partnerships with Türkiye over long-term integration. Establishing strategic alliances between Türkiye and countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain in developing Turkish defense industry products is an important example of a Turkish-European defense partnership. The U.K.’s involvement in the engine production of the Turkish fighter jet KAAN, Spain’s participation in the TCG Anadolu and Italy’s involvement in the ATAK helicopter project contribute significantly to the development of Türkiye’s strategic defense product range. Such partnerships also facilitate the transfer of know-how to the Turkish defense industry. In addition, European countries interested in Turkish defense products also reinforce Türkiye’s role as a player in security and defense architecture. Countries such as Poland, Hungary, Sweden and Finland, which consider Türkiye to be necessary for European security, also reinforce the positive perception of Türkiye.
These three competing views may negatively affect Türkiye’s full integration into the emerging security and defense architecture and may lead to a shift from a cooperative to a competitive approach to European security. In particular, potentially exclusionary formations such as NATO could minimize Türkiye’s potential contribution to European security.
Türkiye’s views of NATO
In the face of Europe’s fragmented and competing views, Türkiye seems to have an approach that embraces integration in Europe’s security and defense architecture. However, this approach is hardly a final and uncontested position in Ankara.
Historically, Türkiye has seen itself as part of European security and defense. Especially since becoming a member of NATO in 1952, Türkiye has shown a strategic commitment to defending Europe, allocating a significant part of its army to this purpose within NATO when necessary. Therefore, in NATO terms, Türkiye has long positioned itself as part of European security and defense architecture. Thus, there is a strong perception that Türkiye is a historical part of the European security community.
Given the changing dynamics of European security and defense architecture, Türkiye considers it a strategic imperative to be considered as an active actor. Recent statements by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan that European security cannot be established without Türkiye indicate that there is a clarity of political will and that Ankara wants to be a whole part of European security. On the other hand, with its military technological competence, strong position in NATO, geopolitical balancing role and advanced defense industry infrastructure, Türkiye considers itself an indispensable ally for European security. As Europe’s defense strategies take shape, the Turkish strategic community generally agrees that integration with Türkiye will contribute to building a more robust and effective security architecture for the continent.
The Ukraine war has highlighted the changing character of warfare, emphasizing the need for modern and asymmetric capabilities, where Türkiye’s advanced military technology, including drone warfare, electronic systems and smart munitions, can significantly enhance Europe’s defense modernization efforts. Politically, as the U.S. reassesses its security commitments, it is neither rational nor strategic to exclude Türkiye – NATO’s second-largest army – from Europe’s evolving security architecture, especially when European nations are increasing defense expenditures while Türkiye already possesses high operational capacity for joint military initiatives.
Geopolitically, Türkiye plays a crucial role in counterbalancing Russia’s expansionist ambitions, strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture in the Black Sea and ensuring European energy security by serving as a key transit hub for alternative energy routes, which is becoming even more vital as Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian resources. Additionally, given China’s rising global influence and persistent Middle Eastern instability, Türkiye’s ability to navigate relations between the West and the East reinforces its necessity within European strategic priorities.
On the defense industry front, while Europe is making significant investments in military technology and industrial infrastructure, its goal of reducing external dependence will be far more effective if it cooperates with strong defense manufacturers like Türkiye, which has already emerged as a globally competitive producer of unmanned systems, armored vehicles, missile technology and next-generation fighter jets. Instead of relying solely on partners like the U.S. and Israel, Europe can bolster its defense capabilities through closer collaboration with Türkiye, making it an indispensable component of the continent’s security and defense architecture.
Strategic autonomy vs. integration
It is crucial to mention Türkiye’s potential strengths as well as challenges. Perhaps the most important of these is the concept of strategic autonomy that Türkiye has adopted more and more in recent years. Strategic autonomy stands out as a grand strategic approach to increase Türkiye’s ability to act freely and unilaterally when necessary in many areas, such as the military, economy, technology and diplomacy. At a time when Europe prefers to increase its strategic autonomy as a union, the competition of strategic autonomies with two different priorities may render Türkiye’s position in European security and defense questionable. Türkiye will not give up its strategic autonomy, and Europe may not want to contend with the constraints imposed by Türkiye’s strategic autonomy.
The second major challenge is the strategic relationship model between Türkiye and Russia. Ankara and Moscow have long been able to manage their conflicts and disagreements while compartmentalizing their relations through relative compromise. More importantly, there is a compromise between Türkiye and Russia regarding energy and other critical areas, especially in the economy. During the Ukraine war, Ankara did not cut ties with Russia thanks to its balanced policy, played a vital role in mediation through leading diplomacy and was able to take strategic steps such as limiting Russia in the Black Sea through instruments such as the Montreux Treaty. However, Russia is the absolute other in Europe’s new security and defense architecture, and this is not likely to change in the short term. Therefore, the question of how Türkiye can be a whole part of emerging security and defense architecture at a time when Russia is at the center as a military and conventional military threat remains essential. There may be limitations to Türkiye’s ability to participate in such an assertive military posture, including the establishment of a European Army.
In conclusion, although Ankara would like to be a whole part of European security and defense architecture, there are still some constraints that make this problematic. The possibility of a new process centered on the European Union could make Türkiye’s integration easier. However, it may not be realistic to expect progress at this point. Another alternative is to include Türkiye in PESCO as the U.K. was included in PESCO in 2021, which could facilitate Türkiye’s integration.
Türkiye is an indispensable, vital actor for Europe to become a geopolitical agency and build a deterrent military posture. However, uncertainties remain. In a multipolar world where Türkiye’s geopolitical portfolio is diversifying and deepening, European security without Türkiye would primarily constitute European geopolitics that would be confined to the European continent. In the long run, this could leave Europe as a weak and fragmented actor in global power competition.
