The expectation from the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) when it came to power in 2002 was that political discussions would be shaped by internal agenda issues.
The contrary happened and under AK Party rule Turkey passed through the process of creating a foreign policy agenda deeper and denser than it has ever been. We can line up the basic elements of this process thus; speeding up the EU accession process; Turkey’s new move putting in taking the initiative on Cyprus; and, most important of all, the Iraq issue. Along with these the referents and expansions inserted by the AK Party’s foreign policy constructors into Turkey’s agenda became the matter of discussion: examples such as rhythmic diplomacy, problem-free politics with neighboring countries, Latin America and Africa years, taking the initiative in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and co-presidency in the Alliance of Civilizations are just the first that come to mind. The issue on which the AK Party had difficulties in this period, more than foreign policy dynamics and its conditions, was the transitivity between internal politics and foreign politics. When a situation that could be considered relatively normal within the EU process kept on popping up at every step taken by the AK Party, it made control of the process more difficult. And this problem was felt intensely, especially during the visit of Hamas, which is now supported by various circles, including former US President Jimmy Carter, and under all tensions that still continue regarding the northern Iraq issue. The AK Party had serious problems in establishing comprehensible balance and harmony between foreign and internal politics. We would not be doing the party an injustice if we say that, while one part of these problems were shaped by provocative news in the media, the AK Party also displayed unsuccessful crisis management for some of these problems. As an example of this, we should consider the case of the crisis after Hamas’ visit.
This picture shows the crisis of the transformations in the balance of global powers and within Turkish foreign policy for the AK Party. We are in a period when America has clearly militarized its hegemony and when all conflicts are shaped on the ground of the Middle East. If Turkey had entered this period while following traditional Turkish foreign policies, if we had “wait-and-see” tactics, some of these crises wouldn’t have occurred. But continuing to follow this direction would cause a larger cost to be paid. Therefore we should assess the AK Party’s foreign policy exactly in accordance with this framework: a context where the balance of global powers has been shaken and is now in the process of being restructured. Turkey found two options before it in this process: it could be included into this course by continuously submitting itself to external forces or it could undertake a serious transformation and look for ways to evolve into more active politics. The AK Party’s performance in foreign policy clearly shows that it prefers the second option. In this context it put forth the vision of “problem-free politics with neighbor countries.” Instead of being a country that adopts limited and distant relationships, often shaped by security concerns, with other countries, Turkey is becoming a nation that puts its problems on the table and is a regional actor. In this way the relationship network was seriously broadened with Syria, Iran, Bulgaria, Greece, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine and Romania. A critical point here is the rapid abolishment of the once prevailing psychology that Turkey is a nation “surrounded by sea on three sides, but by enemies on four sides.” In the Cyprus issue, described as having entered a dead-end street and being troublesome for Turkey, for the first time in many years Turkish foreign policy took the initiative. As an outcome of this, the isolated Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) was transformed into a cou
