Merely skimming over the world news, one quickly notices Türkiye’s growing geopolitical significance. Let me elaborate by highlighting four issues, excluding countless others – including migration, armed drones, the Altay tank and Türkiye’s rapprochement with Egypt. Türkiye will host the third international meeting toward the Ukraine peace summit. Ankara pledged to target all PKK terror groups and its Syrian presence YPG assets in Iraq and Syria. Azerbaijan refused to participate in EU-brokered talks with Armenia in Spain, citing Türkiye’s exclusion. Last but not least, the Abu Dhabi-based investment company ADQ is in talks with Türkiye regarding constructing a railroad over the Bosphorus as part of a trade corridor linking Europe with the Middle East and Asia. Obviously, Türkiye’s direct involvement in peace diplomacy, counterterrorism, the South Caucasus region’s stability and energy/logistics corridors does not just relate to its geographical location.

Azerbaijan has successfully launched a large-scale military operation against the so-called self-declared Armenian state in Karabakh between Sept. 19 and 20. Thus, it has completed the process of what it achieved after the Second Karabagh War in November 2020. After meeting with the representatives of the local Armenians, the Armenians declared the dissolution of their so-called state. Thus, Azerbaijan has resolved the Karabagh issue. From now on, the Karabagh issue is an internal problem of the Azerbaijani state. The two sides will meet on Oct. 5 in Spain to negotiate the new conditions and possibly to sign a peace agreement.

The 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020, which concluded with Baku’s victory, triggered a significant shift in the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus region. Azerbaijan’s successful effort to partially end the Armenian occupation of Karabakh had two major implications.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, on Monday with an official delegation, which included me, to attend groundbreaking and opening ceremonies for a natural gas pipeline and a military complex. By the time of the delegation’s departure, the media reported that eight senior Armenian military officers had been arrested on the charge of plotting the assassination of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan arrived in New York on Sunday to participate in the 78th United Nations General Assembly. During the visit, he is also set to hold a series of meetings with world leaders and influential entrepreneurs. One of the meetings garnering significant attention was the one between President Erdoğan and Elon Musk, the renowned founder of Tesla and SpaceX.

In his addresses on the occasion of the Aug. 30 Victory Day, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan frequently underscored the imperative of bolstering Türkiye’s military prowess, emphasizing that this stance is not a mere option but a necessity. He avered: “Our bitter experiences have taught us that a robust Türkiye hinges on a strong military. Enhancing the deterrent capabilities of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) is not a choice; it’s a necessity for our nation.” While historically, the discourse “strong army, strong Türkiye” was largely employed within the context of Kemalist military narrative to establish the TSK’s supremacy over Turkish politics and reinforce its superior position over political matters, Erdoğan reinterprets it as a pivotal component of a more expansive political narrative.

Türkiye has continued where it left off after the last presidential and parliamentarian elections. The Turkish political leadership has been continuously struggling to increase its strategic autonomy in international politics and to build different axes of stability in regions, reflecting its multilateral foreign policy understanding. When looking at the most recent visit to Ankara and Turkish visits to other countries, we can see that Türkiye will continue to invest in regionalism and minilateralism in the near future.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on Monday as part of his tour of the Gulf states. Over the course of four days, he will visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with a focus on investments and commercial relations. However, it is possible to argue that Erdoğan’s trip goes beyond strictly economic relations and marks the beginning of a new chapter in Türkiye’s relations with the Gulf.

Saturday marked the seventh anniversary of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Türkiye – also known as the "Legend of July 15." It is impossible to forget that dark night and the bright morning that followed. The memory of thinking to myself that “this nation and country do not deserve this experience” on the Bosporus Bridge, as prayers filled the sky and our hearts, remains perfectly fresh.

As we witnessed one of the most significant elections on the centennial of the Turkish Republic’s founding, Insight Turkey proudly presents a special issue that meticulously evaluates the elections and examines how Türkiye’s foreign policy will be shaped in their aftermath and we hope and believe that the insightful and stimulating debates raised on the issue will be helpful to our readers.

On September 27, 2020, regional clashes erupted following a provocative Armenian attack on the front line, leading to a reemergence of the dragged-out Karabakh conflict onto the world agenda. When the clashes first started, few could have guessed that this period would be known as the “Second Karabakh War” and that it would lead to key outcomes in a short time span. With the influence of various factors on the war, especially Turkey’s support, Azerbaijan liberated an important segment of its occupied lands, dealing a clear defeat to Armenia. This war is an important turning point in terms of reversing the status quo which had been attempted to be imposed on Azerbaijan for nearly 30 years. The status quo demonstrated that the Karabakh conflict, and hence Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territories, was unsustainable. The current book conducts a comprehensive analysis of the Karabakh conflict, with contributions from field-expert academics and specialists from Azerbaijan and Turkey. While doing so, it addresses the significance of the Karabakh conflict, its historical background, the Second Karabakh War, and the Karabakh policies of thirdparty actors from a broad perspective.

Türkiye will preserve its “strategic autonomy” and redouble its efforts to promote normalization and stronger relations based on “mutual interests.”

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Azerbaijan earlier this week.

Turkish foreign policy is faced with the task of preserving the gains it has made in various critical issues, from Libya to Azerbaijan, Ukraine to the Eastern Mediterranean, while improving economic relations with Europe, increasing effectiveness within NATO, and managing the impacts of global power shifts.

Türkiye will hold a historic election that could influence both regional and global power balances. Under the leadership of President Erdogan over the past 20 years, Türkiye has faced significant challenges and achieved important successes. When looking at Türkiye's role in the international arena, we have seen that it has been managing regional conflicts and global power struggles with its own foreign policy will. The election will have critical results not only for domestic political developments, the economy and security, but also for foreign policy.

Türkiye has become one of five countries that build fifth-generation warplanes.