The heated debate between the United States and its trans-Atlantic allies reached a peak when U.S. Vice President JD Vance said the U.S. stake in Ukraine’s economy is “a better security guarantee than 20,000 troops from some random country that has not fought a war in 30 or 40 years.” Although Vance later stated that he did not “even mention the U.K. or France,” his earlier comments had already drawn reactions in London and Paris; particularly, veterans in the United Kingdom accused him of being disrespectful to the memories of hundreds of U.K. troops who died alongside the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Vance’s comments came after a special defense summit hosted by U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer. The heads of governments from Ukraine, Europe, Canada and Türkiye, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, gathered in London to show solidarity with Ukraine. This summit was organized after the irate exchanges between U.S. President Donald Trump, Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, which led to the Ukrainian president being told to leave the White House before formal talks took place. Vance’s comments that dismissed Starmer’s “coalition of the willing” to secure Ukraine faced anger and became headlines in the U.K. media. All these developments last week indicate that different approaches of trans-Atlantic allies on the war in Ukraine continue to cause the two sides of the alliance to drift apart.
Past trans-Atlantic rifts
Actually, we have witnessed several rifts in the 78 years of the trans-Atlantic alliance. Although the crises and divergent views occasionally resulted in tensions on both sides of the Atlantic in the past, these temporary crises never evolved into a profound one. The U.S. and Europe somehow managed to stand shoulder-to-shoulder to protect the gains reaped from this cooperation. This emanated from a strong belief that “the U.S. will be stronger if the U.S. has strong allies.” This belief, shaped by the post-World War II order known as the rule-based liberal international order, was still shaping the U.S.' political outlook after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, prior disputes among trans-Atlantic allies were about wars in other parts of the world, such as the Suez Crisis (1956), the Vietnam War (1955-1975) and the Iraq War (2003). This time, though, the war is in Europe, and Europe sees Russia as a significant threat to itself. The alliance and security architecture that were established on the basis of keeping the U.S. within and the Soviet Union out of Europe is undergoing a transformation. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, its presence in Europe has been perceived as a significant and direct threat to European security. The U.S. reluctance to defend Ukraine and maintain its commitment to NATO also raises questions about the future of the U.S.' place in European security.
This trans-Atlantic dispute among allies differs from prior disagreements and rifts not just because of their divergence on common threat perception and European security outlook but also because of the erosion of their shared conception of values and norms. The speech delivered by Vance at the Munich Security Conference clearly reflected the new U.S. administration's distinct view of the global order, which appears more aligned with traditionalism than liberalism, especially in comparison to Europe's approach.
Freedom to be traditional
At the conference, Vance criticized European democracies, arguing that they disregard voters’ concerns on migration and free speech and claimed that the greatest threat facing the European continent was not from Russia and China but rather from within. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz harshly criticized this comment, highlighting that the European conception of liberalism, which has concerned about hate speech and the resurgence of far-right parties due to its Nazi past, is incompatible with the new U.S. administration’s traditionalism based on anti-liberal, anti-modernist and anti-globalist tendencies.
With the Trump administration's conception of traditionalism, which emphasizes the importance of free speech and free and fair elections, as well as the principle of not canceling elections when far-right or far-left parties win, the U.S. aims to pave the way for far-right parties in Europe that have anti-immigration, anti-liberalization and anti-globalization agendas. From this perspective, it appears that the U.S. is shaping a new world order that contrasts with the liberal values prevalent in today's Europe while aligning more closely with the values shared by Russia.
The liberal international world order is built on political and economic principles, including open markets and free trade, democratic governance, the rule of law, multilateral institutions, collective problem-solving, cooperative security and progressive change. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. foreign and security policies were based on ideas that originated from the Enlightenment and modernity. Modernity encompasses three key elements: the rise of individualism over communalism, the emergence of secularism in both politics and culture independent of religious institutions, and the advancement of human reason beyond the cyclical, hierarchical conceptions of premodern times.
Steve Bannon, former senior advisor to Trump – known as a traditionalist – describes modernity as materialistic, individualistic and anti-traditional. Traditionalists like Steve Bannon and Vladimir Putin’s advisor, Alexander Dugin, reject egalitarianism, materialism, individualism, consumerism, globalism, multiculturalism and the progress of modernism. They believe that a free market economy and globalization weaken traditional cultural values, claiming that neo-traditionalist policies can transcend the failure of neo-liberal policies.
According to the new U.S. foreign and security policy, which carries the legacy of Bannon, the enemy of the Judeo-Christian civilization is not Russia. According to them, the primary threat is modernism and its secular and liberal values transcending traditional values such as family, local community and religion. This view also explains the Trump administration's ideological support for the far-right parties of Europe that have anti-liberal, anti-modernist and anti-globalist tendencies. Given the current circumstances, marked by a declining sense of common threat perception and shared values, this trans-Atlantic dispute between the U.S. and its European allies may prove to be different and more difficult to resolve once it has been broken.
