Writing forty years ago in the "Journal of Contemporary History" Andrew Mango, the prominent British historian of modern Turkey, noted Turkey's potential new role in the Middle East as a "middle-power." He observed that "Turkey is socially and technologically the most advanced country of the Muslim Middle East.
If present trend continues, then in a short time, much shorter than one would imagine, it could become once again the most convenient and cheapest source of supply of goods which the Arab countries have been taking from it throughout history... Not only trade but also the success of such cultural schemes as the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara depends in the last resort on the continued growth of a technological society in Turkey."
Mango's optimistic forecast for Turkey's adventures to its East has not come true at the time. But Turkey's profile in the Middle East is rising today and this is registered by some as a new beginning in Turkish foreign policy. Some see this new direction as a result of Turkey's disenchantment with the policies of its traditional Western allies. The common perception is that while Turkey provides security for NATO and the Western bloc in general, Turkey's security concerns are not taken seriously by its Western allies. From the PKK terrorism and the Kurdish issue to Cyprus, Iran, Iraq and the Caucasus, there is a sense of frustration that permeates the Turkish attitude towards European and American policies. Certain EU countries, while acknowledging Turkey's strategic importance for the EU, are quite explicit about their unwillingness to support a process of negotiations that will grant Turkey full membership. Western powers implement confrontational policies in Turkey's immediate neighborhood with total disregard to Turkey's regional concerns. A line of argument one often hears is that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is exploiting this state of affairs to weaken Turkey's traditional alliance with the West. But is this really the case?
It is true that Turkey is currently engaged in a number of initiatives in the Middle East and elsewhere, and they go beyond the traditionally timid and over-cautious foreign policy outlook of Turkish governments. Under the AKP, Turkey is willing to take risks in the most volatile region of the world. As a committed member of NATO, Turkey is treading a carefully charted middle path between political loyalties and geo-strategic realities from Iraq, Iran and Lebanon to most recently the Caucasus. With its relatively bold moves, Turkey seems to have made the big jump not only into a post-Cold War time zone but also into post-modern geo-politics: the best way to protect the nation-state is to act as if it does not exist! In other words, stay within your borders, respect others' but act as if the borders have disappeared. The future of the nation-state depends on its ability to adjust itself to the new realities of a very complex and sophisticated process of simultaneous globalization and regionalization. Not surprisingly, as Turkey eyes a post-nation-state strategic outlook, it comes back to its past experiences, dreams and aspiration in its greater hinterland. Turkey's post-modernity seems to be embedded in its Ottoman past.
Despite its detractors, the new foreign policy outlook is discussed, questioned, formulated and eventually shared by a growing number of domestic and foreign policy circles, diplomats, analysts, academics, journalists, businessmen, NGOs, community leaders, and others. So, what is exactly happening here? Is Turkey's increasing engagement and presence in the Middle East a completely new phenomenon generated and sustained by AKP's domestic policy agenda? Is it a result or sign of the "Islamization" of Turkish foreign policy? Or is it an adjustment and expansion of Turkey's overall aspiration to be a strong regional force in its neighborhood? If Turkey is diversifying its foreign policy agenda, why and how is it doing it?
One key question is whether this diversification and reshu
