The municipal election campaign of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has been riddled with crises, and I am not talking about their various statements that have become the subject of controversy. For example, this is not about the CHP chairperson’s remarks about Turkish citizens who paid for their exemption from military service or Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu’s comments on housewives.

Following in the Good Party’s (IP) footsteps, the New Welfare Party (YRP) and the pro-PKK Green Left Party (YSP), informally known as the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), decided to field their own candidates, as opposed to joining an alliance, for the upcoming municipal election – an emerging trend that creates a political landscape where the "third-way" debate is expected to gain prominence anew.

Local elections are scheduled to be held in Türkiye on March 31. Although local elections may not significantly shape the immediate future of the country, they hold the potential to trigger numerous political dynamics.

With the 2024 municipal elections just 53 days away, the People’s Alliance has momentum, while the opposition parties have failed to form alliances. The main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), built electoral alliances in 2019 and 2023. This time around, it has no choice but to collaborate with the pro-PKK Green Left Party (YSP), informally known as the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), which succeeded the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), in some provinces. It is no secret that the potential partnership between the CHP and YSP in Istanbul would be facilitated by Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu – which would open him up to criticism from the People’s Alliance, as well as the Good Party (IP). Meanwhile, Başak Demirtaş’s seeming interest in running for mayor suggests that the CHP might have to campaign alone in Istanbul. She is, of course, the wife of jailed ex-HDP Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş. Such a development would make “grassroots as opposed to intraparty cooperation” the only option on the table, but the main opposition party has been handling the situation in a very fragmented and counterproductive manner.

After Sweden's NATO membership was approved in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), reports emerged that President Biden sent a letter to Congress seeking approval for the sale of F-16s. These developments indicate that we are nearing the conclusion of the long-debated F-16 issue. If the sale goes through, it could somewhat alleviate the deep-seated distrust that has plagued Turkish-American relations for some time. This distrust has made what should have been a routine arms deal between two NATO allies such a contentious process. Overcoming this hurdle would be beneficial for both countries, but it's still too early to declare the start of a new era. The potential sale of F-16s could pave the way for a new chapter by reducing mutual distrust.

As the municipal election campaign gained momentum with the unveiling of mayoral candidates and the fine-tuning of their campaigns, two major developments took place in foreign policy: the Turkish Parliament’s approval of Sweden’s NATO admission on Tuesday and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to the Turkish capital, where Türkiye and Iran signed 10 agreements.

Traditionally, Türkiye-Iran relations have been defined by a mix of competition and cooperation. Sharing a long land border and possessing a multidimensional historical depth, numerous dynamics simultaneously affect the relationship between the two countries.

Against the backdrop of Israel's massacre in Gaza, attention has been shifting to Iran. Following the bombardment of the Houthis by the United States and the United Kingdom for disrupting commercial shipping in the Red Sea, Iran and Pakistan experienced an escalation, with both sides firing missiles over terrorism. Moreover, Israel killed five members of the Revolutionary Guards Corps in Damascus last weekend, resuming its past operations against the Iranian presence in Syria. The seeming purpose of such strikes is to stop Iran from sending military aid to the Axis of Resistance – namely Hezbollah and Hamas. More important, however, is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's commitment to ensuring the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's regionwide spillover – which contradicts the Biden administration.

The campaign rhetoric heats up with the municipal elections less than 70 days away. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Good Party's (IP) narratives promise to challenge the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP).

A series of attacks and clashes sent shockwaves through the Middle East over the last week. Israel's massacres in Gaza and low-intensity conflict with Hezbollah at the Lebanese border remain underway. Meanwhile, in the Red Sea, the United States and Britain bombed Yemen's Houthis for the fourth time on Thursday. Washington also relisted the Houthis as a global terrorist group.

The recent developments in the Middle East region have led to a deepening instability, with the possibility of conflict increasing day by day. In 2023, we witnessed a period of relative normalization in the Middle East. While countries in the region were trying to minimize the potential for conflict, they had come a long way in developing common potential.

Parliament returned from recess on Tuesday to debate the PKK’s terror attacks. The PKK carried out suicide attacks against the Turkish forces in northern Iraq on Dec. 22 and Jan. 12, claiming 21 lives. That development fueled a multifaceted debate in Türkiye.

The United States has been doing almost everything to otherize and alienate Türkiye throughout the last decade. The damaging steps taken by the last three U.S. governments, namely Barack Obama, Donald Trump and the current Joe Biden administrations, show that anti-Türkiye policy has become the state policy.

Celebrating its 97th anniversary, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has become one of the most prominent institutions in Türkiye’s rising power profile and deepening international geopolitical portfolio. Especially since 2010, there has been a significant change and transformation in Türkiye’s intelligence doctrine and practices. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the comprehensive transformation in Türkiye’s security and strategic environment and the newly emerging threat environment necessitated Türkiye to undergo a holistic strategic transformation. In particular, the challenges posed by the Syrian civil war made it imperative for Türkiye to develop state capabilities in critical areas. The proliferation and diversification of asymmetric threats, the rise of terrorism as one of the primary threats to Türkiye’s security, and the transformation of the region into a center of intelligence wars prompted Türkiye to adopt a new military and intelligence policy. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s revolutionary steps in foreign and security policies and the defense industry were taken in the field of intelligence, and Türkiye identified its strategic priorities and developed its intelligence capabilities and capacities accordingly.

The new year got off to an extremely busy start in Türkiye.

As uncertainty, competition and conflict gain momentum within the international system, Türkiye engages in diplomacy to play a more defining role in global and regional crises.

Twelve Turkish soldiers lost their lives earlier this week in an attack by the terrorist organization PKK in northern Iraq. I offer my condolences to their families and the nation.