This report analyzes how the PKK and the PYD evolved into the SDF and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria with a focus on the PKK’s war crimes and human rights violations, military presence and natural resources as well as Türkiye’s military operations against the PKK/YPG. In this regard, this study represents the result of a significant effort to understand and analyze the PKK/YPG. It is also a pioneering work in academic literature.

As the municipal election campaign gained momentum with the unveiling of mayoral candidates and the fine-tuning of their campaigns, two major developments took place in foreign policy: the Turkish Parliament’s approval of Sweden’s NATO admission on Tuesday and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to the Turkish capital, where Türkiye and Iran signed 10 agreements.

After Sweden's NATO membership was approved in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), reports emerged that President Biden sent a letter to Congress seeking approval for the sale of F-16s. These developments indicate that we are nearing the conclusion of the long-debated F-16 issue. If the sale goes through, it could somewhat alleviate the deep-seated distrust that has plagued Turkish-American relations for some time. This distrust has made what should have been a routine arms deal between two NATO allies such a contentious process. Overcoming this hurdle would be beneficial for both countries, but it's still too early to declare the start of a new era. The potential sale of F-16s could pave the way for a new chapter by reducing mutual distrust.

Traditionally, Türkiye-Iran relations have been defined by a mix of competition and cooperation. Sharing a long land border and possessing a multidimensional historical depth, numerous dynamics simultaneously affect the relationship between the two countries.

Parliament returned from recess on Tuesday to debate the PKK’s terror attacks. The PKK carried out suicide attacks against the Turkish forces in northern Iraq on Dec. 22 and Jan. 12, claiming 21 lives. That development fueled a multifaceted debate in Türkiye.

The United States has been doing almost everything to otherize and alienate Türkiye throughout the last decade. The damaging steps taken by the last three U.S. governments, namely Barack Obama, Donald Trump and the current Joe Biden administrations, show that anti-Türkiye policy has become the state policy.

Celebrating its 97th anniversary, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has become one of the most prominent institutions in Türkiye’s rising power profile and deepening international geopolitical portfolio. Especially since 2010, there has been a significant change and transformation in Türkiye’s intelligence doctrine and practices. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the comprehensive transformation in Türkiye’s security and strategic environment and the newly emerging threat environment necessitated Türkiye to undergo a holistic strategic transformation. In particular, the challenges posed by the Syrian civil war made it imperative for Türkiye to develop state capabilities in critical areas. The proliferation and diversification of asymmetric threats, the rise of terrorism as one of the primary threats to Türkiye’s security, and the transformation of the region into a center of intelligence wars prompted Türkiye to adopt a new military and intelligence policy. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s revolutionary steps in foreign and security policies and the defense industry were taken in the field of intelligence, and Türkiye identified its strategic priorities and developed its intelligence capabilities and capacities accordingly.

The new year got off to an extremely busy start in Türkiye.

As uncertainty, competition and conflict gain momentum within the international system, Türkiye engages in diplomacy to play a more defining role in global and regional crises.

Twelve Turkish soldiers lost their lives earlier this week in an attack by the terrorist organization PKK in northern Iraq. I offer my condolences to their families and the nation.

With the 2024 municipal elections just three months away, the crisis within Türkiye’s political opposition worsens amid accusations of conspiracy. The Good Party’s (IP) decision to contest the election “freely” and “individually” encouraged some members of the municipal councils in Ankara and Istanbul (who were part of the "ecosystem" that the two mayors created) and some parliamentarians to resign.

Describing 2023 as a relatively quiet year for Turkish foreign policy would exclude the events of Oct. 7 and their aftermath. The trend of normalization, ongoing since the general elections in May, played a pivotal role in determining the overarching course of foreign policy. Despite unresolved issues, emphasis was placed on minimizing potential conflicts and prioritizing common interests. In the post-election period, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opted for a regional foreign policy centered on Gulf country relations, making the economy a primary focus. To mitigate security risks from Syria, ministerial-level talks with the Assad regime were initiated. Noteworthy strides were made in normalizing relations with Israel and Egypt. Erdoğan’s robust support for Azerbaijan in liberating Karabakh bolstered Türkiye’s status as a geopolitical player in 2023.

The IP leadership’s refusal to endorse the main opposition Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) mayoral candidates in Istanbul and Ankara caused uproar among local chapters and council members, whom those municipalities support financially, as well as other proponents of electoral alliances. In other words, Ekrem Imamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, widely seen as mayors of the 2019 alliance, used their influence over the IP – arguably the price that IP Chair Meral Akşener and her movement are expected to pay.

Recently, commentators have been arguing whether CHP Chairperson Özgür Özel would make an offer to right-wing fringe parties. Recalling that pro-change voices within the main opposition party had been critical of the “table for six” and DEVA, Babacan argued it would be a “contradiction” for Özel to enter into talks with them. That was hardly surprising considering that the former CHP chairperson, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, faced criticism over his decision to offer parliamentary seats to DEVA, the Felicity Party (SP), the Future Party (GP) and the Democratic Party (DP). Indeed, the pro-CHP media treated the right-wing fringe parties like parasites.

The municipal election campaign in Türkiye kicked off with a debate on alliances and cooperation. It seems that the People’s Alliance will campaign for the March 31, 2024 elections similarly to the 2019 and 2023 elections following a meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairperson Devlet Bahçeli.

Amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza, a tragic situation unfolds daily, with thousands of civilians losing their lives. This includes the merciless killing of babies and children, the murder of pregnant women and their unborn children, and the targeting of ambulances carrying wounded individuals. Hospitals, schools, and refugee camps have become the target of bombings, while essential services like water, fuel, electricity, and internet access are cut off.

As we rightfully experience this pride, we must be able to analyze the republic’s achievements and problems rationally so that Türkiye can move forward prosperously for centuries to come. That question takes us to the seemingly endless political and ideological debate over the republic’s structure.