Turkey has been involved, historically and demographically, with many of the regions of “frozen conflict” in post-Soviet space. At this point, one might consider the position of Turkey as being at the epicenter of Euro-Atlantic and Russian extremes concerning the frozen conflicts. Georgia, since 1991, has been considered a valuable “strategic partner” by Turkey for several reasons. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s Caucasus Pact idea is a good opportunity to create an inclusive (Russia+Turkey+Georgia+Armenia+Azerbaijan) new foreign policy approach at this stage. This approach should be merged with the representation of all the frozen or unfrozen conflict areas, peoples, ethnic groups and regions included under the roof of such an alliance.
Turkey and the “frozen conflicts” in former Soviet space Turkey has been involved, historically and demographically, with many of the regions of “frozen conflict” in post-Soviet space. The Gagauz question in Moldova, the status of Crimea and the resettlement of Crimean Tatars to their homeland in today’s Ukraine, the Chechen problem, the Abkhazian and South Osetian questions, the issue of Ajarian autonomy, the relocation of Ahıska Turks in Georgia, the problems of Borchali Azeris in Georgia, the dispute over Nagorno Karabakh, and many other frozen conflicts concern not only the representatives of these ethnic groups within Turkey but also Turkish governments, due to the activities of lobbyists acting on these ethnic groups’ behalf. In Turkey, many such lobbyists are well organized around advocacy and civil society organizations. They usually have a direct influence on both the Turkish public and on Turkey’s administrations. Beyond the agitations of the lobbyists, the frozen conflicts themselves represent potential instability in the region, as was recently seen in the latest South Osetia (5 Days) War. The status of these regions as ‘instabilizers’ is one of the reasons why Turkey, and probably the rest of the world, has had difficulty engaging in the economics and politics of the region. Another issue that characterizes the frozen conflicts is the existence of the former hegemon, Russia, as an integral part of all of them. This latter point is the reason why all these frozen conflicts have long been considered the major obstacle to Euro-Atlantic interests in post-Soviet space.1 At this point, one might consider the position of Turkey as being at the epicenter of Euro-Atlantic and Russian extremes concerning the frozen conflicts.
Turkey and Georgia Georgia, since 1991, has been considered a valuable “strategic partner” by Turkey for several reasons. The first reason really is strategic; having a weaker, friendly country between gigantic Russia and Turkey as a “buffer zone” makes good tactical sense. It is assumed that to be a neighbor of a superpower, old, new or reborn, is risky. Second, especially after the invasion of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia, and in the wake of the Nagorno Karabakh problem, Georgia was valued again as the only direct corridor by which Turkey could reach Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and the rest of the Turkic republics. Thirdly, Georgia provides the best option for the transportation of Caspian energy riches to international markets via Turkey, bypassing both Russia and Iran. For a good part of the 1990s, the Georgian economy survived thanks to shuttle trade between Turkey’s Black Sea provinces and its own. The Turkish military helped its Georgian counterparts in their ambitious effort to meet NATO standards in their military and defense infrastructure. In some cases, Turkey trained Georgian military officials, and some basic, non-sophisticated equipment was transferred by Turkey to Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, and Kars-Tbilisi-Baku ra
