In recent days, the Iranian-Israeli conflict has become a central focus for international relations experts, particularly those analyzing the Middle East. The key question is whether this conflict will escalate into a full-scale war. This topic has not only captured the attention of policymakers but also raised concerns among the general public. Discussions often revolve around the possibility of a regional or even global conflict. In response, states are already preparing for such scenarios. How actors interpret events and predict their opponents’ actions is crucial to the outbreak of wars, highlighting the importance of perception in conflicts.
On Oct. 1, Iran's direct missile strike on Israel from its own territory for the second time strengthened the argument that an irreversible threshold has been crossed, pushing the situation closer to full-scale war. Israel continues to issue new and creative threats against Iran daily. In response, Iran is not only retaliating with similar threats but is also adjusting its military posture to prepare for a potential attack and the possibility of war.
Although Israel and Iran have been threatening each other for nearly 40 years, this time, the situation feels different. In the past, these routine threats were not accompanied by such a tangible possibility of war on the ground. For Iran, these threats served to consolidate domestic support and elevate its position among Islamic countries. For Israel, portraying Iran as an enemy facilitated U.S. aid, potential cooperation with the Gulf states and efforts by the West to contain Iran. However, this time, both nations seem to be at each other's throats. Meanwhile, ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon are adding to the rising tension between them.
Diverging Strategies
From the outset of the Oct. 7 events, scenarios of an Iranian-Israeli war began to surface. Iran’s close ties with Hamas, Hezbollah and Ansarullah fueled predictions that it would eventually be drawn directly into the conflict. Over the past year, this possibility has grown significantly. However, Iran’s stance from the beginning has been to avoid direct involvement in the war, sticking to its "forward defense" strategy through its regional allies. Israel, on the other hand, has repeatedly provoked Iran with attacks, aiming to escalate the conflict in Gaza into a broader war with Iran. Despite these provocations, Iran has resisted responding in ways that would lead it into the conflict, labeling this restraint as "strategic patience."
However, Israel's April 1st attack on the Iranian Embassy in Damascus forced Iran to respond militarily. For the first time in history, Tehran decided to directly strike Israel with missiles. This led Israel to escalate its attacks further, or at least it believed it had created a justification for doing so. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut by Israeli forces exhausted Iran’s strategic patience.
Both leaders were key figures in Iran’s regional network of armed groups, and their assassinations raised questions about Iran’s ability to protect the so-called "axis of resistance." This also undermined the ideological framework that is central to Iran’s political system. As a result, Iranians began questioning why there had been no strong response to Israel. The answer came with Iran's missile strike on Israel on Oct. 1.
In the second missile strike on Oct. 1, Iran delivered a more impactful message. Key military and intelligence targets, including the Nevatim Airbase, were successfully hit. In an attempt to conceal the damage, Israel resorted to censoring satellite images. Yet, Iran's attack was measured enough that it didn’t provide Israel with a clear-cut justification for war under normal circumstances. Now, Israel is preparing for another retaliatory strike, likely escalating the tensions further toward war.
The U.S., perhaps the most critical actor in this equation, does not want a regional war. Yet, it has not effectively stopped Israel from pushing the situation toward that outcome. Netanyahu has been exploiting the power vacuum created by the upcoming U.S. elections, and whether he will de-escalate post-elections remains a big question. Despite everything, the measured nature of Iran’s second attack prompted the U.S. to set limits on Israel’s retaliation. At the very least, we know that the U.S. will not participate in strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But can we say with certainty that the U.S. will refrain from joining the war if Iran responds to these attacks? The short answer is no. No further explanation is needed; the answer speaks for itself. In fact, Netanyahu is closer than ever to achieving what could be considered the magnum opus of his political career: provoking a war between the U.S. and Iran.
What Will Happen Next?
Amid all this tension, efforts by Iran to engage in regional diplomacy have drawn attention. After the Oct. 1 attack, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Qatar, where he met with both Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan. Pezeshkian’s meeting with the Saudi Foreign Minister was particularly significant for the implementation of the Saudi-Iranian normalization agreement, which has been repeatedly tested by the regional tensions following the events of Oct. 7. In the following days, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
The diplomatic engagements of both Pezeshkian and Araghchi with Gulf leaders are crucial for informal Iranian-U.S. diplomacy. It is known that Qatari and Saudi officials have facilitated the exchange of messages between Iran and the U.S.. These meetings underscore Iran’s continued preference for diplomacy and de-escalation. The Gulf states appear to share a similar stance.
However, the possibility that Israel’s military apparatus might take a step to undermine these de-escalation efforts cannot be ruled out. The risk of war significantly increases if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear or oil facilities. Such an escalation could quickly draw global powers into the conflict, as Iran’s oil is primarily exported to China, and any disruption to its oil infrastructure would impact global oil supplies.
An attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, in particular, would provoke a more robust Iranian response. Recent discussions among Iranian lawmakers about revisiting the country’s defense doctrine and considering the nuclear option are noteworthy. Additionally, reports of nuclear tests conducted by Iran in desert areas suggest the country is preparing for the worst.
Unfortunately, the outlook ahead is far from promising. The region is now more threatened by war than it has ever been due to the rising tensions between Iran and Israel. Iran continues to place considerable weight on restraint and regional diplomacy, while Israel views Iran's backing of Hamas, Hezbollah and Ansarullah as a justification for carrying out significant strikes on Iran, negating the need for negotiation. Global powers' involvement – especially that of the U.S. – remains vital in averting or increasing future hostilities. A major risk for the area is the possibility of a full-scale conflict without swift de-escalation.
