In Syria, Turkey's goal is to prevent civil war and sectarian violence, and encourage gradual democratisation Turkish foreign policy has come under close scrutiny in the wake of the Arab Spring. Prior to this, discussion of Turkish foreign policy - especially in the US - revolved around specific themes such as "axis shift", "drifting away from the West", and "authoritarianism". In the midst of the Arab revolutions, we see a continuation and a rehashing of the same themes. While criticism of Turkish foreign policy is based partly on a certain degree of scepticism towards Turkey's actual capabilities, a lot of the criticism seems to be based on a misreading of Turkish foreign policy initiatives in a given context.
Most recently, some analysts argued that Turkey's Syria policy was a failed one, given Assad's unwillingness to take Turkey's advice on reforms. These analysts argued that, if Turkey chose not to project its hard power (such as creating a buffer zone, or possibly launching a limited military intervention) on Syria, this meant that Turkey had no leverage on Syria. Thus, they argued, we would have to consider Turkey's "zero problems with neighbours" policy a hollow one with no real substance or practical applicability. This perspective takes for granted the fact that Turkey's neighbourhood policy proposes a general framework rather than offering specific strategies. In other words, we need to consider Turkey's neighbourhood policy to be a guiding principle out of which specific, concrete policies are devised. In order to estimate whether or not this policy has failed, let us analyse the local application of this strategy vis-a-vis Syria. So, what is Turkey's strategy towards Syria? Let's start from scratch: Turkey's main strategic goal is to maintain Syria's territorial integrity, prevent civil war and sectarian conflict, and lead the country to structural democratic change in a gradual manner. Turkey learned lessons from the consequences of instability and sectarian conflict in Iraq. The infamous de-Baathification process in Iraq led Turkey to conclude that every single political, religious and ethnic demand need to be satisfied to some extent in the transition process. Accordingly, Turkey's plan in Syria is to achieve a transition that would include all parties in the country, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Baath Party. Inclusive option That is why Turkey needed to engage both the Assad regime (with which it had good relations until recently) and the opposition, because both of these groups could bring the country to the brink of disintegration or civil war.
If Turkey were to side with only one part of the opposition, as many analysts demand, this would ultimately lead to a military intervention from outside that would create decades of instability, similar to that caused by the Iraq war. In such a scenario, Syria's clock would be set back a few decades at the very least. Under these conditions, there are few options for any country to take, except to engage all sides in order to find as peaceful a resolution as possible. Accordingly, portraying Turkey's position as siding with or supporting the Assad regime against the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people is misguided. Turkey wants to avoid sparking permanent instability and sectarian conflict in the region, which is a serious potential risk in Syria. A Sunni-Shia conflict, which has become one of the major fault lines in the region as a result of the invasion of Iraq, is being provoked directly by Saudi Arabia and Iran, and indirectly by Iraq and Israel. This is the least desired scenario for Turkey, because it does not pursue sectarian policies in the Middle East - despite having an overwhelmingly Sunni majority. While the Saudis are trying to bring Sunnis into the Salafi fold, thereby creating an anti-Shia front, Iran is countering with an attempt to forge an anti-Sunni front by bringing Syria's Alawite population closer to Shiism. This kind of sectarian politics is all too familiar from Iraq, and benefits certain countrie
