A Comparative Overview: Egypt's 2012 and 2014 Constitutions

Two different constitutions were drafted and put on a popular vote in three years after Hosni Mobarak was overthrown in Egypt.

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A Comparative Overview Egypt's 2012 and 2014 Constitutions
The Possibility of General Sisi's Becoming President

The Possibility of General Sisi's Becoming President

It is possible to say that the next step for the Egyptian Minister of Defense, General Abdel Fattah al Sisi, will be the presidential post. This is because new campaign groups and movements to support his candidacy have already surfaced.

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Since the operational political engineering that the Gulen Movement has launched by leveraging its power within the bureaucracy corresponds to a developing new form of tutelary, it threatens democracy in Turkey.

Now in Egypt, there is a new Constitution before us which institutionalizes the Military-Judiciary-Police State and narrows the sphere of the civilian politics in the post-coup period, and paradoxically is dominated by completely secular, liberal and Naserist positions.

The declaration of Muslim Brotherhood, or Ikhwan, as a “terror organization” has been accepted as one of the most radical decisions taken since the overthrow of the President Mohammed Morsi on July 3, 2013.

In a period where different political powers have come to terms and made a notable progress about the new administration, and while 96 percent of the relevant works are completed in Yemen, could the launch of a new movement to divide the country starting from the region of Hadramout be a coincidence?

The November Nightmare of the Egyptian Administrations

For the Egyptian administrations, the month of November has turned into a nightmare for the last two years. The developments of the last two weeks remind the period which followed the Constitution Declaration promulgated by President Mohammed Morsi in November 2012.

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The November Nightmare of the Egyptian Administrations
Critical Turning Points in the Ikhwan-Military Relations

Critical Turning Points in the Ikhwan-Military Relations

For all these years, neither the Ikhwan changed the state nor did the state change the Ikhwan.

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At the moment, the Middle East is going through turbulent times. It is clear the end of this political crisis is not near.

As the trial of ousted Morsi and top Ikhwan officials in Egypt begins on Monday, November 4, 2013, the opposition has already called this week a “Trial of the People’s Will” in which demonstrations will be organized to protest the lawsuit against Morsi who was deposed by the military intervention on July 3, 2013.

What does Ennahda movement do in order not to share the same fate with the Morsi administration in Egypt and what are the difficulties it comes across?

The debate we are having today is, in a way, the debate over whether the duty of guarding Sykes-Picot, despite the passage of a century, should be carried on or not.

Both Egyptian and Turkish armies have wielded disproportionate influence on the political course of their respective countries. Their roles were not confined to security sectors, as expected from an army in a democratic political sphere.

A lose-lose balance has already been formed, so both parties have no choice but to reach a political consensus as they have notably high grassroots potential.

Although the use of chemical weapons in Syria has forced the United States (US) administration to take action, it does not seem to make a big difference in the US attitude towards the issue in terms of strategy.

Sustaining normal relations with Egypt would not be only morally unacceptable, it also has the potential to generate significant costs to the EU, in terms of its intermediate and long term interests in the region.

The West still does not trust the political actors holding Islamic traditions in the Middle East, and it does not know how to interact with them effectively.

Before the “week of departure” protests organized by the opposition in Tunisia on August 24, 2013, tension ruled as the Nahda Party in power continues to have talks with the opposition to prevent the country from becoming a second Egypt.

The August 14 massacre in Egypt proved the helplessness of coup supporters and indicated that the military, which fails to compete against the resistance of the masses through political means, returned back to old methods.