I believe there are just a few nations like us who have heard the expression “political solution” as frequently as we have. Our past experiences show that the peace expected from a “political solution” does not generally occur or is delayed quite some time to be realized. For Turkey, the Kurdish problem and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror which we have experienced dearly for years are the most painful examples of this.
Though the content is very different, a methodologically similar discussion is being plotted nowadays as a popular heading as part of the Syrian crisis.
While a political solution is debated for the Syrian crisis, roughly three types of dynamics lead in the widespread media discourse: a) This approach should be tried since Bashar al Assad insists on not stepping down, or since he is not toppled down, b) Turkey should change her policy in Syria and prefer negotiations, c) Political solution theses of Russia are proven right.
The interesting part is that most politicians or media figures who voice this widespread discourse inside Turkey have adopted roughly a pro-securitization perspective in the Kurdish question and in the disarmament of the PKK. An approach that is in favor of security in Turkey but of a political solution in Syria is quite contradictory. First of all, let’s make note that. Therefore, it is very doubtful when the opposition parties and the associated names in Turkey who talk a lot about “a political solution” in Syria really want a solution. The names who, with their bankrupted moral values, justify the massacres by the Baath regime on the one hand, and regard the initiative to stop the blood-shed in their own country as treason; are , in gentile terms, simply being inconsistent .
A similar repugnancy is experienced in the Syrian crisis. First of all, the crisis in Syria did not start with a process similar to the Arab Spring. In other words, the process did not start because of tension between the Baath regime and the people just because millions took the streets. Quite contrary, the crisis in Syria broke out as the Baath regime committed a massacre in order to stop the locals and small groups who protested earlier killings by the regime. That is to say, a problem that could have been managed through simple political interventions was turned into a bloody mess by Assad. In a period where Assad has lost hope to reclaim his leadership, it is obscure what Assad and Russia understand from the political solution which the Syrian leader had never sought even when his rulership was not open to question. Neither in the beginning of the crisis nor today, has the issue ever been a political solution but the future of the rulership for Assad. He did not agree to a transition period even when he had a chance to protect his seat in the earlier days. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect that he would settle for a solution in a scenario where his loss is minimized. Let alone, the Arab League initiative, the Annan Plan, the Brahimi talks and the first Geneva meeting have made more progressive offers to the Baath regime than what is offered today, but all turned into null and void.
Secondly, we are astounded to see how the thesis “Assad could not be overthrown, so Turkey should back up from her mistake and support a political solution” has become a widespread analysis or a serious determination. Unless one had no memory lapse regarding the developments in Syria, we should remind the fact that Turkey is the only country that had exerted tremendous efforts and time to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis in the last three years. During the first six months of the crisis, almost every week different individuals from different institutions had conducted a shuttle diplomacy between Ankara and Damascus with the hope of finding a political solution to the issue. As the massacres of Assad continued, hopes were diminished following the hours-long last meeting in August 2011 and no conta
