Describing 2023 as a relatively quiet year for Turkish foreign policy would exclude the events of Oct. 7 and their aftermath. The trend of normalization, ongoing since the general elections in May, played a pivotal role in determining the overarching course of foreign policy. Despite unresolved issues, emphasis was placed on minimizing potential conflicts and prioritizing common interests. In the post-election period, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opted for a regional foreign policy centered on Gulf country relations, making the economy a primary focus. To mitigate security risks from Syria, ministerial-level talks with the Assad regime were initiated. Noteworthy strides were made in normalizing relations with Israel and Egypt. Erdoğan’s robust support for Azerbaijan in liberating Karabakh bolstered Türkiye’s status as a geopolitical player in 2023.

Ankara and Budapest have developed a close partnership in many fields since the Council’s inaugural meeting in 2013. Indeed, they elevated their bilateral relations to the level of advanced strategic partnership.

The IP leadership’s refusal to endorse the main opposition Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) mayoral candidates in Istanbul and Ankara caused uproar among local chapters and council members, whom those municipalities support financially, as well as other proponents of electoral alliances. In other words, Ekrem Imamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, widely seen as mayors of the 2019 alliance, used their influence over the IP – arguably the price that IP Chair Meral Akşener and her movement are expected to pay.

The events of 2023 have significantly diversified potential geopolitical and strategic scenarios for 2024.

For Türkiye, Turkish-Greek relations have shifted from being solely a security concern to a potential axis of cooperation. While prioritizing its foreign policy within a broader geopolitical context, Ankara has chosen to address issues with Greece pragmatically. Nevertheless, changes in the regional strategic landscape, Türkiye’s rising influence, emerging regional challenges and its geopolitical presence in the Eastern Mediterranean following the maritime jurisdiction agreement with Libya have once again placed the relationship on a competitive and security-focused footing.

"There is no problem that cannot be solved between us," Erdogan told reporters as he met Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Athens on Thursday, adding that he wanted to turn "the Aegean into a sea of peace and cooperation".

Türkiye-Greece Summit | Sailing Through Positive Agenda

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to Qatar where he held a bilateral meeting with Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and attended the 9th meeting of the Türkiye-Qatar High-Level Strategic Committee and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit.

On Dec. 1, the Wall Street Journal published a story by Dion Nissenbaum saying that Israel is planning to kill Hamas members around the world, mentioning those living in Lebanon, Türkiye, and Qatar. Turkish officials responded with a harsh statement through Anadolu that the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) will never permit such undertakings, as various intelligence organizations tried to in the past. Pointing out the illegality of these alleged acts in Türkiye, officials said they had warned Mossad representatives in Türkiye. Turkish intelligence has made public several intelligence operations revealing Mossad cells and their activities in Türkiye. This shows that another wave of intelligence competition is coming in the days ahead including Mossad’s quest to attack Hamas in third countries and the MIT’s efforts to repel the Mossad threats.

Over the past few months, the Republican People's Party (CHP) has been working toward convincing the Good Party (IP) to join forces ahead of next year's municipal elections. Local leaders who happen to be part of the municipal ecosystem in Istanbul and Ankara support some type of collaboration.

Protest movements against Israel's operations in Gaza have sparked a reexamination of the limits of freedom of expression in the United States. Efforts by pro-Israel groups to equate criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism have become organized and systematic. The campaign, conducted through advertisements in media outlets and lobbying activities in Congress, aimed to convey the message that crowds taking to the streets to defend Palestinian civilians were contributing to the rise of anti-Semitism. However, censorship applied by some of the world's leading universities to groups supporting Palestine, the fear of being labeled as anti-Semitic, and threats to withdraw support from influential donors demonstrated how the boundaries of academic freedom could be defined. The experience of a prominent figure losing their job or being marginalized due to their pro-Palestinian stance also illustrates how organized political forces can effectively use the trauma of anti-Semitism as a weapon.

Israel has been bombing the Gaza Strip for almost two months, killing more than 15,000 Palestinians, most of whom are innocent children and women. In spite of calls and criticism from international organizations, hundreds of millions of people around the world and more than a hundred governments, Israel keeps committing atrocities.

The municipal election campaign in Türkiye kicked off with a debate on alliances and cooperation. It seems that the People’s Alliance will campaign for the March 31, 2024 elections similarly to the 2019 and 2023 elections following a meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairperson Devlet Bahçeli.

Elon Musk, the world's wealthiest businessperson, faced a new campaign against him when he liked an antisemitic post on his platform, X (Twitter). Media Matters, an organization that published a report on the prevalence of antisemitic content on the platform, triggered major American companies advertising on X to withdraw their ads. Musk, experiencing significant commercial losses, attempted to demonstrate his non-antisemitic stance by visiting Israel. However, associating this with proving one's non-antisemitic stance is problematic, considering the history of antisemitism predates Israel's history, and leaders like Prime Minister Netanyahu have a long history of trying to equate criticism of Israel's policies with antisemitism.

Even if Israel emerges from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a limited military victory, it remains the loser of the conflict. Following its intense campaign against Gaza post-Oct. 7, Israel either failed or chose not to seize the greatest historical opportunity since its establishment. Today, it grapples with an ontological security crisis and profound regional and global status anxieties on a scale unseen since 1948.

The mass killings carried out by Israel in response to the large-scale Hamas attack on Oct. 7 have caused a great reaction, both in the region and around the world. As Israeli attacks continued to commit all kinds of war crimes, even some of the Western states that have been giving unconditional support to Israel began to call on Israel to stop its atrocities.

The prisoner exchange agreement reached between Israel and Hamas marks a significant turning point in the course of the war. The agreement implies that Israel has stepped back from its pledge to halt operations until all prisoners are released. However, it is clear that Israeli attacks will continue after a brief hiatus. Predicting that the release of all Hamas prisoners will take months, if not years, it is not difficult to anticipate that the conflict will intermittently intensify and persist for an extended period. The events since October 7 have become the foremost agenda item in the region, transforming the pursuit of a solution to the Palestinian issue into a new driving force. Therefore, in the coming period, we can expect the Gaza war to continue with its ups and downs, while diplomatic efforts for a final resolution intensify.