Turkey's Corruption Crisis: a Political Probe

Corruption cases have a devastating impact on political parties. Turkey was recently hit by a corruption probe that shook the country's government. On December 17, 2013, Turkish police detained over 50 people as part of an investigation into alleged corruption.

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Turkey's Corruption Crisis a Political Probe
What have we Learned from the December 17 Operation

What have we Learned from the December 17 Operation?

We face a center before us that, rather than arresting the criminal, accumulates crimes until it decides to use them for its own politically motivated operation later, committing an ignominious crime itself.

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The legitimate politics is being attacked by judicial “time bombs”. All the bombs were set in and at different locations and times, and have been exploded simultaneously on the eve of 2014, the year that is expected to be Turkey’s year of destiny.

The Gülen Movement was known for the cool-headed decisions it took at the risk of severe criticism during Turkey’s most difficult times. Today, it would be expected that the same movement will display a similar rationality in a changing Turkey.

Frankly, the question is this: When is an attempt of seeking regulations on tutoring centers considered not as a “coup”?

The political performance presented in the Diyarbakır visit of Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdish Regional Administration in Northern Iraq, and of Erdoğan will create an effect of clearing the early reservations of the Kurdish Movement about the political ground and political strength of Erdoğan.

The Constitution Shackle and Democratization

It is impossible for the old tutelary foundation that is cemented by the Constitution to carry the emerging new edifice of Turkey.

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The Constitution Shackle and Democratization
5 Questions Regional Repercussions of the Diyarbakır Rendezvous

5 Questions: Regional Repercussions of the Diyarbakır Rendezvous

Taha Özhan: Hosting Massoud Barzani in Diyarbakır is a significant turning point which has a consistent decade-old background history, and we may regard it as an ultimate-point for the state.

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The AK Party was struggling to find a mid-way amid the red lines drawn by the three opposition parties. If getting rid of the Jacobean articles of the junta Constitution was not possible, then at least considerable effort was going to be exerted to subdue the emphasis on ethnicity in those articles.

Barzani, particularly for the last month, made his stance against PYD known. Not to mention, Barzani has been seizing on to a deep strategic alliance with Turkey in the recent years.

The Turkish-Kurdish peace process is facing challenges which can be ironed out only through politics not violence.

Unless the PKK perceives disarmament, not as leverage, but as the key to its own bargaining chip, it will not be able to achieve any founding political vision.

As one Kurdish issue is being resolved, another is being created. The new Kurdish issue is nothing but “the PKK’s Kurdish issue.”

Both what the future democratization efforts entail and how expedient they will be depend, not on Erdoğan administration, but on the opposition. Unless the opposition makes a move soon, democratization in Turkey will have to come gradually in “mini democratization packages”.

In the multi-phased peace process, we face an entity that keeps employing unreasonable provocations in the “withdrawal” phase, the first leg of a road map on which their leader proceeds through consensus.

One should not expect a cure-all magic package but appreciate every single positive step because improvements take place through small steps extended over a period of time in Turkey.

In the last few years, the “Kurdish alienation” has deepened more with the cunning of the PKK-PYD and the support of the Arab nationalism that has risen in the region with the occupation of Iraq.

The Kurdish grassroots almost completely supporting the solution process of the Kurdish question will also question for how long , from here on, they will continue to bear with the Kurdish political elites who have difficulty to convey the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s message.