The passive attitude kept up by the U.S. throughout all of the processes in the Middle East is not a result of indecisiveness but the very policy itself, which Ankara knows

Calling for renewed talks may be tempting, but it has little meaning until Turkey removes PKK militants from the southeast and the international community draws up a plan to facilitate political transition in Syria

In recent months, it has been interesting to see opposition pundits who were initially critical of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's assessment that the two groups were one and the same slowly reach the same conclusion.

By killing civilians en masse, the PKK created a new distinction between Turkish citizens: A large number of people openly condemning the attacks and a small minority who would rather point their fingers at the government.

The policymakers in Ankara are required to accomplish a structural transformation program for socio-economic development, while fighting a low-intensity war in the southeast and overcoming the international repercussions of the crisis with Russia. Not an easy job for sure. But then, who said that politics was an easy job?

The PKK's new strategic discourse in its fight against the state is determined by the HDP's leadership which has recently brought up the ‘self-governance' debate. In this way, the HDP's organic connection with the PKK has been proven with the party's own hand.

The HDP made significant progress in the political arena, but it must keep in mind that a toxic mix of violence and cross-national alliances will not secure legal status for their voters.

Over the next decade, Turkey will have no choice but to deal with the consequences of the PYD's potential rise to power in northern Syria. As such, it is simply unrealistic to expect Turkey to negotiate with the PKK at this time.

The PKK faces an existential crisis of having unleashed hell on Turkey's Kurds, the organization finds it increasingly difficult to fuel nationalist sentiments by expanding its territory in Syria.

Moving forward, Kobani will be remembered as a transit route for terrorists and weapons as opposed to a glorified resistance-hence the Kurdish winter. Would the Kurdish nationalists hear Mr. Barzani out?

It appears that the matter of struggle against the PKK will continue to be the primary issue on the political agenda. At this point, the attitude the HDP will take is of the utmost importance.

What Turkey desperately needs, above and beyond party politics, is an end to the elite-level tensions that trigger political polarization across the country.

The CHP, MHP and the HDP, have all constructed their political discourse on otherizing the AK Party at every level, yet still each of them sees the party as its partner in a possible coalition government.

The growing power of the PKK and the PYD in northern Syria will remain a source of tensions between Turkey and the U.S. until Washington starts to understand what exactly concerns Ankara

There is a discrepancy and even contradiction between Turkey's foreign policy activism and the polarization of its domestic politics. While the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) keeps surprising everyone with its bold and decisive foreign policy moves, it is losing its grip on the domestic pulse.   

In the parliamentary elections of July 22, 2007, AKP (Justice and Development Party) won 47% of the votes, obtaining a very strong mandate to take issue with Turkey’s outstanding problems. In the predominantly Kurdish east and southeast region, the AKP doubled its vote from 26% to 53%. The AKP seemed to have persuaded the Kurds thanks to the party’s earlier moves to solve the Kurdish problem by granting more rights and freedoms as well as jobs and economic prosperity. Having started the negotiation process with the EU and obtaining such a strong mandate from the Kurdish voters, why did the AKP turn its back to the Kurdish issue?  This can be explained with reference to three groups of factors working at the domestic, the EU and international levels.