The new normalization necessitates a paradigm shift in the nature of relations. The international system, the region and Turkey witnessed major transformations in the last 10 years which will impact Turkish-Israeli relations.

The political institution must make legal and institutional arrangements in order to save the sphere of politics from tutelary mechanisms.

The biggest struggle of Turkish politics today takes place between those who have lived the 1990s and those who have gone through the 2010s. Not only are their visions of the future but also their perceptions of power are in conflict.

The Turkish-Kurdish peace process is facing challenges which can be ironed out only through politics not violence.

In the last few years, the “Kurdish alienation” has deepened more with the cunning of the PKK-PYD and the support of the Arab nationalism that has risen in the region with the occupation of Iraq.

China is ruled by a regime blinded by rich anger and has determined to adopt unpeaceful regional plans and strategies behind the efforts to assimilate diversities and eliminate opponents in East Turkestan.

The Islamist identity of Morsi and his party seems to be the major reason for the reticence of the international community and media in defining this coup a coup!

Judging from the scene revealed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the paradigm has bankrupted and the transition to a new order has already begun since the world of friends and enemies who stood by the tutelage regime for years is totally confused now.

The increasing timidity of Western democracies to pursue the principle of responsibility to protect at an international level is leaving the Chinese government with the freedom to oppress .

The last thing Turkey desires should be the entrapment of the solution process similar to that of Kirkuk’s.

A far-right party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), owes its post-1980 existence to a great extent to the Kurdish issue and the terrorist acts of the PKK.

The dynamics of the current political climate in Turkey, which make impossible to create a new Constitution based on consensus among political parties, can be discussed under three headings.

The messages coming from the Imrali during the solution process reflect the efforts for creating a new conceptual frame to settle in the legitimate-center.

Belated Kurdish nationalism perhaps could not give anything to the Kurds, but it surely bestowed at least 20 years to the regime of tutelage for it to survive.

Whatever happens, relations between the two countries cannot and will not reach the high level of cooperation between Turkey’s pro-coup elites and Israel in the late 1990s.

Trade relations between Turkey and Russia indicate that divergence between these two countries regarding the resolution of the Syrian crisis has not deeply influenced the relations between the two.