When we look at the G7 summit communiqué, we see an extensive list of problems related to various crisis areas and challenges in the international system. From Ukraine to Taiwan, from artificial intelligence to energy, leaders have pledged support for different initiatives in many problematic areas. While the joint declaration is filled with a series of good intentions, it is difficult to say that there are clear proposals leading to solutions. Although there are references to many initiatives previously agreed upon in other platforms, it is impossible to find agreement proposals that can provide lasting solutions in crisis areas such as Ukraine, Taiwan, and Palestine. This situation highlights how difficult it is for Washington to produce concrete solutions around comprehensive strategic policies and underscores the weakness of Biden's global leadership record.
Has the era of major agreements ended?
The announcement that the countries participating in the summit hosted by Italy will open a $50 billion credit line for Ukraine and that this will be paid from the interest of Russia's frozen financial resources in the West was the first item of the summit communiqué. The leaders, emphasizing that their support for Ukraine will continue, expressing their concern about Russia's nuclear threat, and warning China about aiding Russia do not equate to a concrete solution proposal. Instead of presenting a peace plan and calling on Russia and China to implement it, the G7 leaders did not go beyond the accusations they had previously directed at these countries on other platforms. During times when the 'rules-based' international system was not entirely dysfunctional, global leaders used to announce or propose major agreements at such summits, but we now witness that those days are long gone.
The United Nations Security Council, the most effective institution of the international system established after World War II under America's leadership, could take steps in crisis regions following negotiations and bargaining among the great powers. One of the most recent examples of this was the intervention in Libya. Pressured by and with the support of Gulf countries, Washington agreed to a 'humanitarian intervention,' but Russia accused it of following a regime change policy by turning the operation into a move to overthrow Gaddafi. Russia's reaction after approving the intervention decision was not entirely in good faith but showed that the US would struggle to get decisions passed by the UNSC.
Previously able to persuade Russia and China on sanctions against Iran, the US strengthened its hand in pressuring Iran thanks to the UNSC's sanctions decision. However, Russia's decision to block the path to regime change also closed the door on any steps regarding Syria. In the following years, the UNSC, appearing increasingly unable to take concrete steps, became progressively ineffective. So much so that it is hard to say America has spent enough energy on diplomatic negotiations with Russia and China in recent years. In fact, instead of turning UN platforms into mechanisms for producing solutions in crises like Syria and Ukraine, we observed that America was content with placing the responsibility on Russia and China, sending a moral superiority message.
America's global leadership claim
Obama's reluctance to intervene in Syria and Trump's skeptical approach to the international order were signs that America was moving towards relinquishing global leadership. With Trump's election in 2016, America signaled to the world that the status quo in leading the international order would not continue. Arguing that the 'rules-based' international system was not in the American people's interest and needed to be renegotiated, Trump shocked the international system. The indication that America might even abandon fundamental institutions like NATO, if necessary, not only triggered new searches in foreign policy and security matters for Western countries but also was interpreted as America's renunciation of its global leadership claim. In this context, Biden, elected president, declared with 'America is back' that America had not given up on its leadership claim.
Biden's first test of global leadership came with the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Accepting Trump's agreement with the Taliban and choosing to inform Western allies rather than negotiate with them, Biden effectively handed the country back to the Taliban after a twenty-year war. Viewing Russia's invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to bring the West back together around a common goal, Biden has not supported Turkey's efforts for a quick and concrete peace, nor has he himself presented a comprehensive peace plan to date. Supporting Ukraine is as legitimate as putting forward a plan to bring Russia to the table and uniting the West around this plan was just as necessary for American leadership.
Regarding Taiwan, we see that Biden, who constantly warns China and gives the message that Taiwan could become a new Ukraine, is not making efforts to produce a lasting solution with China. On the issue of Gaza, Biden, who announced a ceasefire plan supported by G7 leaders, neither convinces Israel nor puts forward a lasting peace plan that can ensure Israel-Palestine peace. These examples show that the Biden administration, in many crisis areas, fails to move beyond being a party supporting limited initiatives to show leadership. Defining the grand narrative as a struggle between democracies and autocracies, Biden does not have a comprehensive strategy for how to combat autocracies. The fragmented approaches have very limited chances of succeeding in global challenges like artificial intelligence and renewable energy or in regional crises like Ukraine and Gaza. The 'privileged' policy of American politics towards Israel, which creates a legitimacy crisis for Biden, clearly shows his struggle to pass the global leadership test and how this erodes the 'rules-based' international system.
