What does France want from Turkey?

For the last decade, the main concern of Turkish foreign policy has been the crises in the Middle East and North Africa, which include threats emanating from different terrorist groups and state failures as a result of Arab insurgencies. Ankara, however, has been spending its energy on its relations with Western countries, especially France and the United States, rather than on these crises. Nowadays, many observers both from inside and outside the nation have been trying to answer the question, “What does the West want from Turkey?” In this piece, I will try to trace the roots of Paris' approach toward Ankara.

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What does France want from Turkey
COVID-19 has affected strategic relations radically

COVID-19 has affected strategic relations radically

Turkey will continue to strengthen 'entrepreneurial, humanitarian understanding of foreign policy,' says foreign minister

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The current tension in the Eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece is a consequence of Greece’s unfair and maximalist claims that violate Turkey’s rights in the region. Any sober analyst would agree on the unfair nature of the plans that Athens tries to impose on Ankara. These aggressive claims are supported by actors like France, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) who all have their own problems with Turkey.

Turkey’s most recent steps in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean raised questions in foreign capitals about that country’s international standing. As Americans grappled with President Donald Trump’s call to delay the 2020 elections, the European media went berzerk over the Hagia Sophia’s reclassification as a mosque. On the one hand, they called on European leaders to respond to “Sultan” Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whom they charged with neo-Ottomanist expansionism. At the same time, European reporters appreciate that Erdoğan has been filling the power vacuum that the United States left behind, empowering his country in the process. They also understand that the Turkish president, as an experienced leader, does what his European counterparts fail to do and takes his country to a new level of agency.

Hagia Sophia’s conversion into a mosque sparked a debate over President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political agenda. Some observers believe that the administration has a to-do list yet to be completed. That claim boils down to the idea of Turkey’s gradual Islamization. Western media outlets, too, amplified that message by speculating that Erdoğan undid Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s legacy and revived the Ottoman Empire to bring back the caliphate. Others, out of excitement or sorrow over Hagia Sophia’s reopening, jumped on that bandwagon.

Defeated coup of July 15, 2016 commemorated in panel by Turkish Communications Directorate

Impact of July 15 on Turkey’s foreign policy

The Gülenist Terror Group's (FETÖ) July 15 coup attempt in 2016 was one of the darkest moments in Turkish political history. It was a traumatic event for the Turkish bureaucracy and military.

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Impact of July 15 on Turkey s foreign policy
Emerging power vacuums and Turkey s new activism

Emerging power vacuums and Turkey’s new activism

Hagia Sophia’s reinstatement as a mosque resulted in a sudden spike in Western media reports about President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Needless to say, almost all of those stories were full of accusations and speculation about Turkey’s agenda.

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Wednesday will be the fourth anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey. Four years ago, Turkish people defeated an attempt to overthrow the country's democratically elected government. The people demonstrated their commitment to democracy by organizing mass rallies for more than 30 days after July 15, to prevent another such attempt.

Insight Turkey, one of the leading academic journals in Turkey, in its latest issue 'Turkey- U.S. Relations in Troubled Times' presents the current situation of the Turkish-American relations. Furthermore this issue provides to its readers a general framework of regarding the latest developments in Turkey and its surrounding regions while taking into account the COVID-19 repercussions.

Ankara’s intervention in Libya fueled a fresh debate in European and Middle Eastern capitals on Turkey's role in the world. Reflecting the view that Turkey has evolved into a more powerful player, that discussion has two dimensions: First, it concentrates on the concrete shifts in the balance of power in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, it is a propaganda war with lots of speculation about "real" intentions. It would be impossible to make sense of Turkey’s most recent moves, capabilities and objectives without distinguishing those two aspects.

After a successful military operation by Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA) against the pro-Haftar militias and mercenaries over the last several weeks, Haftar and the states who support him began to talk about a cease-fire. However, most observers do not trust the putschist Haftar and supporting states. They question the sustainability of the cease-fire because of Haftar force’s repeated violations of not only cease-fires but also basic human rights. Besides, Haftar forces have repeatedly committed war crimes. For instance, they attacked civilian targets on the first day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan and launched air attacks on hospitals and schools.

Libya's government is supported by Turkey, the only country providing the nation with weapons to fight putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by many regional and global powers – such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Greece, Russia and France. Although European Union countries officially support the legitimate government of Fayez al-Sarraj, a number strongly support its illegitimate rival, Haftar, on the ground.

Turkey has been following a two-track foreign policy for the last two decades. On the one hand, Turkey has been following an Ankara-centered and relatively independent foreign policy. After the collapse of the bipolar world, Turkey, similar to many other countries, has been trying to increase autonomy in its foreign policy.

Since the beginning of the coronavirus crisis a lot of countries and international institutions failed in the test of containing and managing this crisis. Among these, were the most advanced nations, economic powerhouses of the world and the most sophisticated regional organizations.

It's fair to say the world is more than fixated on the COVID-19 outbreak. The fear of illness unites us all. We are watching the virus spread and adapting our daily lives by taking precautions accordingly. Society’s current concern over contracting the disease is unlike that of any previous security concern

Turkey faces growing pressure to retreat from three locations: Idlib, where Turkish forces are trying to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe; Libya, with which the Turks concluded a defense pact; and the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey is defending its rights under international law.

Turkey and Pakistan have always had a particularly close relationship. During the Turkish War of Independence, India's Muslim community contributed to the war effort. That affinity evolved into a deeply-rooted fraternity upon the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Turkey is fighting on three fronts to manage the Idlib crisis: a military operation, diplomacy and international public opinion.

It is true President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin have had an amenable relationship. Turkey and Russia are also both regional actors that share partnerships on many issues. The recent cooperation between the two countries is not as black and white as foreign affairs and alliances between countries were during the Cold War. To call this period of cooperation a "honeymoon," however, would be incorrect.

Even though the Syrian crisis continues to influence politics in the Middle East and the global balance, the European Union and major European powers, like the U.K., Germany and France, have continued to be the most reluctant and ineffective actors dealing with the crisis.