In this new volume of SETA Security Radar, we analyze the main dynamics shaping Türkiye’s security and geopolitical landscape with references to the most significant foreign policy and security issues throughout 2023.

Successfully managing the risk of a confrontation in Syria, the two leaders strengthened their cooperation in a broad range of areas, including energy, tourism and defense. As the bilateral trade volume reached $69 billion, the two nations set a new target of $100 billion. Against the backdrop of the construction of Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, there are ongoing talks over the possibility of building another plant in Sinop.

In this new volume of SETA Security Radar, we analyze the main dynamics shaping Türkiye’s security and geopolitical landscape with references to the most significant foreign policy and security issues throughout 2022.

Ultimately, the Astana Process reflects the nature of politics today.

Turkey, which did not recognize the annexation of Crimea, supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity. At the same time, it wants Russia and Ukraine – countries, with which it has cordial relations – to resolve the Donbass crisis through negotiations. Again, Russia could find it more suitable to work with Turkey in the Black Sea, as it already does in the Caucasus.

This issue of Insight Turkey, through off-topic pieces, covers very significant issues related to the changes in the international system, Karabakh War, Gulf rivalry, and developments in the Balkans.

The main issue on the table during the Erdoğan-Putin summit was the increased regime and Russian attacks on Idlib and Afrin. These attacks were jeopardizing the terms of the deal that was reached in 2018. Both leaders confirmed their willingness to maintain the existing status quo in Syria and work together to restore security and stability in the war-torn country. Both Moscow and Ankara are more pressured than ever to find a political solution in Syria due to the enduring costs and potential security risks of the Syrian civil war.

It is time to look at Turkey-Russia relations from the perspective of an 'early response to great power competition' rather than the classical balance-of-power approach.

The Turkish-Russian ceasefire in Syria has run its course, setting the stage for confrontation between Ankara and Moscow if a new buffer to smoothen tensions isn’t achieved.

Washington’s perspective on Ankara is no longer plagued by excessive tensions either. It would seem that the Afghanistan talks and Turkey’s efforts to normalize ties with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a positive impact on the atmosphere. Yet the state of idleness and deadlock, which Erdoğan mentioned, won’t change in the absence of fresh attempts to foster bilateral cooperation.

Strategic Flexibility under Geopolitical Anxiety

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey has faced the gravest problems in the region regarding security, economics and refugees. That picture has not changed. At every turn, a new wave of issues knocks on Turkey’s door. That Europe and the U.S. have not taken initiatives required for a political transition in Syria is a major factor in this. Another leading cause is Russia’s desire to solve the crisis through military force. From the outset, Russia has deployed a course of destruction called the 'Grozny model." It is a policy consisting of three stages: besiege, destroy and rule. Russia has implemented this formula in many areas, particularly in Aleppo, which has wreaked extensive destruction and killed thousands of civilians.

After a six-hour meeting between leaders and technical committees, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Russian counterpart announced a cease-fire for Syria's Idlib. During the meeting at the Kremlin, the presidents gave short speeches. The whole world followed the process as the decisions could trigger an escalation in violence while intensifying the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Syria. Turkey and Russia both wanted to end the civil war but were unwilling to concede their positions. For both Turkey and Russia, bilateral relations were at stake as well.

The Idlib crisis reached another turning point after the signing of the Turkish-Russian agreement last week during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow. Reports indicated that the challenging process of negotiations carried on for more than six hours. The end result of the negotiations generated a lot of debates regarding its provisions and the potential roadblocks in its implementation.

Last week’s agreement between Turkey and Russia established a new deconfliction plan and demonstrated that the two countries were united in their commitment to the Astana and Sochi processes. Even more important was their ability to stop the clashes in Idlib and preserve the framework of their bilateral relations.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Moscow this week to hold talks on the Idlib crisis. The world closely followed his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. All experts were sure that this would be the tensest meeting between the two leaders since the 2015 jet incident.

For days, both Syrian public opinion and the world have been discussing the question of “What is Turkey doing in Idlib, Syria?” If you are really curious about this question, you must have been born after 2015. Turkey has intervened in northern Syria for both humanitarian and security reasons due to a number of problems, such as nearly 4 million refugees coming to the country during the nine-year war, instability spreading from Syria and dozens of people killed in missile strikes on Turkish soil, which were launched from across the Syrian border.