The wave of democratization, which began with the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, took down the authoritarian leaders of Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Whereas the uprising in Bahrain was crushed thanks to Saudi Arabia’s military intervention, Iran and Russia ensured the survival of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria.

This book will answer the key research question of which characteristics (changing or enduring) of the Syrian War caused Turkey and Russia to oscillate between the extremes of war and alliance.

It's fair to say the world is more than fixated on the COVID-19 outbreak. The fear of illness unites us all. We are watching the virus spread and adapting our daily lives by taking precautions accordingly. Society’s current concern over contracting the disease is unlike that of any previous security concern

The March 5 agreement between Turkey and Russia put an end to the military confrontation in Idlib, Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, shook hands on that deal to de-escalate what had become serious bilateral tensions. The 2018 Sochi agreement has thus been updated.

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey has faced the gravest problems in the region regarding security, economics and refugees. That picture has not changed. At every turn, a new wave of issues knocks on Turkey’s door. That Europe and the U.S. have not taken initiatives required for a political transition in Syria is a major factor in this. Another leading cause is Russia’s desire to solve the crisis through military force. From the outset, Russia has deployed a course of destruction called the 'Grozny model." It is a policy consisting of three stages: besiege, destroy and rule. Russia has implemented this formula in many areas, particularly in Aleppo, which has wreaked extensive destruction and killed thousands of civilians.

Last week’s agreement between Turkey and Russia established a new deconfliction plan and demonstrated that the two countries were united in their commitment to the Astana and Sochi processes. Even more important was their ability to stop the clashes in Idlib and preserve the framework of their bilateral relations.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Moscow this week to hold talks on the Idlib crisis. The world closely followed his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. All experts were sure that this would be the tensest meeting between the two leaders since the 2015 jet incident.

For days, both Syrian public opinion and the world have been discussing the question of “What is Turkey doing in Idlib, Syria?” If you are really curious about this question, you must have been born after 2015. Turkey has intervened in northern Syria for both humanitarian and security reasons due to a number of problems, such as nearly 4 million refugees coming to the country during the nine-year war, instability spreading from Syria and dozens of people killed in missile strikes on Turkish soil, which were launched from across the Syrian border.

The Idlib crisis reached another turning point after the signing of the Turkish-Russian agreement last week during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Moscow. Reports indicated that the challenging process of negotiations carried on for more than six hours. The end result of the negotiations generated a lot of debates regarding its provisions and the potential roadblocks in its implementation.

To solve the crisis in Idlib, the international community is hoping for the success of a four-nation summit and fresh diplomatic talks. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and France's President Emmanuel Macron, scheduled to take place on March 5, keeps alive the hope of ending what the U.N. called “the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century” diplomatically.

The recent escalation of violence between Turkey and the Assad regime in violation of the Sochi deal marks a significantly tense moment that may risk a deterioration of relations between Ankara and Moscow. Turkey has given an ultimatum to the Assad regime to withdraw its troops outside of the zone encircled by Turkey's military observation points until the end of February. So far, the Assad regime has resisted the idea of withdrawal and continued to expand further into the territory. However, Turkey expects its Russian counterparts to either convince or force the Assad regime to comply with the conditions laid out as part of the Sochi deal that was signed in September 2018.

By the end of February, Turkey expects Bashar Assad to withdraw to the agreed-upon cease-fire line stipulated in the Sochi agreement. Yet, nothing has come out of diplomatic negotiations between Ankara and Moscow.

Andrej Kreutz raised a poignant question in his book from 2007, "Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe," well before the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011. Even though Russia has been an important player in the Middle East since the Cold War era, its influence in the region has burgeoned since Syrian President Bashar Assad invited Moscow into the Syrian civil war in 2015.

SETA Security Researcher Bilgehan Öztürk commented on the fall of Maarrat al-Numan to Syrian regime forces on TRT World.

SETA Security Radar attempts to anticipate the course of major security issues Turkey faces and how to develop and enhance sound and relevant responses within this increasingly challenging regional security environment.

On 10-12 June 2015, a convention of Balkan think tanks was organized by the SETA Foundation, with financial support of the Turkish Prime Ministry Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB). During the event, researchers from Balkan think tanks discussed various political issues faced by the region and Turkey. This report summarizes the remarks made during the workshop sessions.