Egypt from Revolution to Coup d'état
SETA presents the analyses of SETA experts on Egypt in order to better understand the transformation process in Egypt which began on January 25, 2011 and the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi by the military coup on July 3, 2013.
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No Country for Old Men
Kemalism has maintained its course through a kind of political reincarnation and via different groups of elites. Today, we face a similar picture under several headings, from the Syrian revolt to the solution of the Kurdish question.
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Although Assad and the apparatus of security that surrounded him managed to survive, their obstinacy left Syria in ruins.
As long as the U.S. insists on the old order of the Middle East via its support for Israel, it will soon no longer possess the necessary political software to deal with the new Middle East.
What are the chances that the actual object of fear is a stable post-al-Assad Syria? In the aftermath of turmoil and chaos, the newly achieved stability is expected to rest upon a Sunni demographic with a hint of Islamist politics.
The U.S.-Turkey relationship took on a fresh dynamic with the onset of the Arab Spring in early 2011.
Why is Al-Assad Stils Standing?
Having lost its hold on the majority of the country, the al-Assad regime is now ensconced in Damascus.
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The Last Guardian of Sykes-Picot
it is clear that the post-2002 Middle East has new circumstances, and each actorÂ’s ability to adapt to these will determine its future.
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Turkey needs to draw lessons from the past and take necessary steps to facilitate the process.
We will continue to witness a U.S. policy striving to adjust to the process in Syria. Nevertheless, this policy is not one that is pregnant with revolutionary turning points!
If the Kurds want to realize their demand they must first become one of the main actors of the resistance movement to depose al-Assad in a way that does not leave room for doubt.
Another approach to the analysis of the Syrian crisis is to acknowledge the massacres committed by the Assad regime, but in the end, to own up the analyses mentioned above.
A country which really wants to engage in a war would not have carried out an active diplomacy with Syria for six months and with international community for thirteen months.
Had ErdoÄŸan supported the Baath regime or had he remained a spectator, as the opposition demanded, it would have taken him only months to do the political harm to himself that his adversaries could in decades.
Turkey does not have an interest in positioning the AK Party government as a belligerent in the Syrian war just as it does not have an interest in putting the CHP in a Baathist position.
Syria today is a place where cities are being annihilated, tens of thousands civilians are being massacred, and hundreds of thousands are forced to become refugees.
The transformation of peaceful protesters into armed revolutionaries was triggered not by choice, but by necessity and obligation.
High-ranking officers who were killed in the blast in Syria also took away the regimeÂ’s immunity, the mutual trust of those in the regimeÂ’s inner circle and the loyalty of the army.
It is necessary to get rid of national security concerns based on false assumptions of past years in order to ensure social peace and regional effectiveness.
Syria and Israel are two semi-states which base their identities on pretended hostility.
Turkish foreign policy has entered a new phase, and it is highly possible that this phase will prove to be a breaking point.
