The recent developments in the Middle East region have led to a deepening instability, with the possibility of conflict increasing day by day. In 2023, we witnessed a period of relative normalization in the Middle East. While countries in the region were trying to minimize the potential for conflict, they had come a long way in developing common potential.

Parliament returned from recess on Tuesday to debate the PKK’s terror attacks. The PKK carried out suicide attacks against the Turkish forces in northern Iraq on Dec. 22 and Jan. 12, claiming 21 lives. That development fueled a multifaceted debate in Türkiye.

The United States has been doing almost everything to otherize and alienate Türkiye throughout the last decade. The damaging steps taken by the last three U.S. governments, namely Barack Obama, Donald Trump and the current Joe Biden administrations, show that anti-Türkiye policy has become the state policy.

Celebrating its 97th anniversary, the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) has become one of the most prominent institutions in Türkiye’s rising power profile and deepening international geopolitical portfolio. Especially since 2010, there has been a significant change and transformation in Türkiye’s intelligence doctrine and practices. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the comprehensive transformation in Türkiye’s security and strategic environment and the newly emerging threat environment necessitated Türkiye to undergo a holistic strategic transformation. In particular, the challenges posed by the Syrian civil war made it imperative for Türkiye to develop state capabilities in critical areas. The proliferation and diversification of asymmetric threats, the rise of terrorism as one of the primary threats to Türkiye’s security, and the transformation of the region into a center of intelligence wars prompted Türkiye to adopt a new military and intelligence policy. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s revolutionary steps in foreign and security policies and the defense industry were taken in the field of intelligence, and Türkiye identified its strategic priorities and developed its intelligence capabilities and capacities accordingly.

The operation launched by Hamas against Israel on Oct. 7 continues, accompanied by Israel’s extensive air and ground operations. Israel’s military attacks carried out to overcome the shock experienced within the country, reestablish military deterrence and eliminate Hamas through the collective punishment method have now completed their 24th day.

Türkiye carried out airstrikes in Syria and Iraq last week in response to a terrorist attack against the Interior Ministry in Ankara. During that period, one statement and one picture attracted plenty of attention.

Merely skimming over the world news, one quickly notices Türkiye’s growing geopolitical significance. Let me elaborate by highlighting four issues, excluding countless others – including migration, armed drones, the Altay tank and Türkiye’s rapprochement with Egypt. Türkiye will host the third international meeting toward the Ukraine peace summit. Ankara pledged to target all PKK terror groups and its Syrian presence YPG assets in Iraq and Syria. Azerbaijan refused to participate in EU-brokered talks with Armenia in Spain, citing Türkiye’s exclusion. Last but not least, the Abu Dhabi-based investment company ADQ is in talks with Türkiye regarding constructing a railroad over the Bosphorus as part of a trade corridor linking Europe with the Middle East and Asia. Obviously, Türkiye’s direct involvement in peace diplomacy, counterterrorism, the South Caucasus region’s stability and energy/logistics corridors does not just relate to its geographical location.

Recent developments in Syria show that the dynamics caused by the civil war are still in effect as demonstrations against the Bashar Assad regime continue due to economic dissatisfaction and clashes between local Arab tribes and the PKK terrorist group’s Syrian presence YPG accelerate.

Successfully managing the risk of a confrontation in Syria, the two leaders strengthened their cooperation in a broad range of areas, including energy, tourism and defense. As the bilateral trade volume reached $69 billion, the two nations set a new target of $100 billion. Against the backdrop of the construction of Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, there are ongoing talks over the possibility of building another plant in Sinop.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan paid an important visit to Iraq between Aug. 22-24. Iraq is one of the most strategic countries in the neighboring geography for Türkiye in terms of the fight against terrorism, energy geopolitics, economic relations, internal stability and rivalry between the countries in the region. Therefore, Fidan’s visit is quite critical before President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's expected visit to Iraq.

For a considerable period, Türkiye and Syria have engaged in discussions aimed at reshaping their bilateral relationship into a new framework. Most recently, a diplomatic meeting took place in Moscow in April involving foreign ministers from both countries, along with Russia and Iran. However, since April, the trajectory of these talks has become increasingly uncertain. This uncertainty has been shaped by the complex nature of the Syrian conflict, the divergent priorities of the external actors, the strategically ambiguous behavior of the Bashar Assad regime and the lack of capacity of the state of Syria. Other dynamics exist that make the talks between Türkiye and Syria more difficult to reach the real objectives of the negotiations process.

It cannot be said that the efforts of Turkish foreign policy to open up space for itself through pragmatic steps in line with regional and global balances are adequately understood. Analyzes that depict Türkiye as "breaking away" from the Western alliance are based on the misconception that Türkiye cannot rationally determine its national interests and act accordingly. When every relationship President Erdogan develops beyond the Transatlantic alliance is presented as either an alternative to the West or a distancing from the West, unfounded prejudices about Türkiye's foreign policy emerge. As analyses of Türkiye are reduced to variations of the perception of a country caught between the West and the East, constantly experiencing ebb and flow, problematic perspectives on Turkish foreign policy become widespread. Unless it is based on the assumption that Türkiye has legitimate national interests and priorities, these analyses lose their ability to provide a profound explanation.

Turkish foreign policy is faced with the task of preserving the gains it has made in various critical issues, from Libya to Azerbaijan, Ukraine to the Eastern Mediterranean, while improving economic relations with Europe, increasing effectiveness within NATO, and managing the impacts of global power shifts.

Sinan Oğan, who contested the presidential election as the ATA Alliance’s candidate, endorsed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ahead of Sunday’s second round. Rejecting allegations of a “deal” between himself and the incumbent, he insisted that he acted in line with his “principles” and highlighted the importance of “stability” with reference to the People’s Alliance’s parliamentary majority.

We experienced another historic night on May 14. The number of votes President Erdoğan received, surpassing 27 million, represents the highest vote count ever recorded. Despite the theories that 5 million new voters would be a handicap for him, the sense of "enough is enough" among the electorate would help secure victory for the opposition, and the economic problems would guarantee a change in power, we saw that these claims did not materialize in the results. The problems among the opposition, their inability to offer a clear message despite the formulation of a joint program, and the difficulties faced by candidate Kılıçdaroğlu in persuading large masses determined the fate of the election. Thanks to the strong psychological advantage brought by the first round, Erdogan will secure a greater proportional advantage and win in the second round.

The Western media doubling down on its anti-Erdoğan campaign in the home stretch is hardly surprising. In addition to The Economist, which went well beyond endorsing the opposition candidate in Türkiye’s presidential race, publications like Foreign Policy, Le Point, L’Express, Der Spiegel and The Washington Post have been notably involved in the Turkish elections.

With Türkiye entering the final week of the 2023 election campaign, rhetorical battles have notably escalated. It would be wrong to reduce that development to peak polarization because what observers have called this year’s most important election remains critically important for the country’s future.