Historically, Western governments prefer liberal values and principles in their foreign relations only when they enjoy a competitive advantage. When the governments experience crises and find themselves in a disadvantaged position, hatred, alienization and otherization increases. This has been the case recently with the Western world knee-deep in political, social and economic crises.

The current European governments and politicians who face many political, social and economic problems try to use other states, peoples and civilizations as a tool for their own interests. They try to instrumentalize them for their own good, no matter how it might harm others.

Two news stories with completely opposite titles appeared in Western media last week. The first story was about Turkey allegedly provoking its NATO allies by testing the S-400 air defense system. The other related to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s remarks on the “unprecedented” level of cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine, viewing the Ukrainian leader’s decision to award President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with the medal of honor as problematic for Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. That development, The Times argued, could be detrimental to Erdoğan’s relationship with Putin.

As Turkey grows stronger, it must develop a new kind of relationship with not just the Western alliance but also Russia. The Black Sea may be a geopolitical space where that claim will be put to the test.

Since the emergence of the Eastern Mediterranean crisis, there have been a lot of debates and questions regarding the role of the major powers in the potential resolution of this dispute. After Turkey’s calls for dialogue and diplomacy fell on deaf ears in the early days of the crisis, many assumed that one of the major powers would play the role of mediator for this problem.

Through a wide range of articles and commentaries, this issue aims to bring to its readers a comprehensive framework on the transformation of Turkey’s Defense Industry and changing patterns of its military strategy.

After U.S. President Donald Trump had the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain sign the Abraham Accords on Sept. 15 at the White House, people have been wondering which Arab country will be next.

In the wake of the Arab insurgencies and revolutions, the Arab world lost touch with its role as the main carriers of Arab nationalism. In reality, the process of the dissolution of the Arab world started on 9/11 when some citizens of Saudi Arabia executed the most devastating terrorist attacks in the history of the United States. Shortly after Sept. 11, the U.S. invaded Iraq, claiming that the Saddam Hussein regime was about to produce nuclear weapons.

Turkey called back its research vessel Oruç Reis to port in order to support efforts by Germany and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to facilitate dialogue with Greece. As Ankara and Athens continue to exchange statements, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean will be discussed at the Special European Council on Sept. 24-25.

In this piece, I will attempt to answer the question that I asked in last week’s column, in which I tried to assess the French approach toward Turkey. I will elaborate on the general view of the Western countries toward Turkey by answering the following questions: Why has the West been otherizing and alienating Turkey? What are the main sources of anti-Turkish sentiments in the West? Why is the West concerned about the democratic institutions in Muslim countries? Is the rise of Turkophobia related to the most recent wave of Islamophobia? Why is the West against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government? Are they worried about the rise of the Turkish state?

For the last several weeks, French President Emmanuel Macron has been targeting Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his statements about regional developments in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Although it is not uncommon for him to make such undiplomatic positions when it comes to foreign policy, his recent remarks about Turkey demonstrate that his tone is becoming more aggressive than it used to be.

For the last decade, the main concern of Turkish foreign policy has been the crises in the Middle East and North Africa, which include threats emanating from different terrorist groups and state failures as a result of Arab insurgencies. Ankara, however, has been spending its energy on its relations with Western countries, especially France and the United States, rather than on these crises. Nowadays, many observers both from inside and outside the nation have been trying to answer the question, “What does the West want from Turkey?” In this piece, I will try to trace the roots of Paris' approach toward Ankara.

Turkey counters encirclement strategy by concluding maritime accord with Libya, unnerving inimical regional, global powers

'No one can question' deal, 'especially France' says Turkish Vice President Fuat Oktay

After the formalization or normalization of bilateral relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, many observers began to discuss the agreement's impact on Middle Eastern politics and the Arab World. It seems that the biggest impact will be on the future of the “political Arab world,” which collapsed in the wake of the Arab insurgencies and revolutions during the Arab Spring.

During a meeting with the editors of The New York Times seven months ago, former U.S. Vice President and current Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden labeled President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan an “autocrat” and criticized Turkey for its constructive relations with Moscow and policies over northeastern Syria.

What is the current natural gas situation in Turkey? What does the future hold for Turkey’s energy market? How will Turkey’s economy and foreign policy be affected?