Since Turkey shot down a Russian jet for violating its airspace on Nov. 24, President Vladimir Putin has been making strongly-worded statements to keep tensions high.

Conventional European pragmatism to conceptualize Turkey as a buffer zone to keep the troubles of the Middle East away from civilized Europe are bound to fail, as shown by the dramatic unveiling of the Paris attacks.

Accusing Islam of the attacks in Paris rather than DAESH, the terrorist organization, with no association whatsoever to the religion itself, will only serve to further spread Islamophobia, not end terrorism.

Turkish-Russian relations have been transformed in a unique way since the late 1990s. Ever increasing economic relations have paved way for better political relations, bringing cooperation perspectives to fore while having competing agendas at the same time. The past several years witnessed confidence building between the countries as the relationship rose to the level of a multi-dimensional partnership; however, there are also ideational and material factors that limit Russian-Turkish partnership. The future of multi-dimensional partnership will largely depend on both countries’ ability to set a strong structural base for mutual and long-term beneficiary relationship.

 Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ delivered an unprecedented speech on Tuesday. Given its tone, arguments and scope, Başbuğ's speech may herald the beginning of a new era in civilian-military relations in Turkey

The results of the March 29 municipal elections go beyond the local scene and will have a bearing on the 2011 general elections. The "message" of the elections, however one reads it, has become the key word. Indeed, the electorate has told political parties, "You've got a message." The question is how to read it. 

After years of opposition and months of heated debate, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) began broadcasting in Kurdish today on TRT 6.  

I get this question all the time: how does Turkey do it? In international relations, Turkey wants to be a member of the European Union, continue its partnership with the US, have good relations with Russia and Iran, be fully involved in Iraq and the larger Middle East, increase its presence in the Balkans and central Asia and open up to Africa and Latin America. Domestically, Turkey wants to strengthen its democracy, improve its human rights record, continue its economic development, find a solution to the Kurdish problem and ease the tensions between religion and the Turkish state.  

This article considers the August 2008 visit to Turkey by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and analyzes relations between Turkey and Iran in general. The tensions and crises that followed the 1979 Iranian Revolution are briefly presented in order to provide a better understanding of the present state of relations. Then we draw a picture of the situation after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, bringing widespread changes to Turkish foreign policy. We also call attention to Turkey’s changing role in the regional balance of power, and to the significance of that role both in Turkey’s relations with Iran and with the United States.

Perhaps the most consequential and drastic decision in Turkish foreign policy in recent months was to engage in direct negotiations with Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. This is significant because, since the onset of Iraq War in 2003, Turkey has sought to ignore or marginalize Iraqi Kurds, and has refrained from all acts that could be viewed as concessions or de facto recognition. Although the Iraqi Kurdish leadership has received red-carpet ceremony in Ankara in the1990s, Turkish foreign policy toward northern Iraq, since the war, has been stymied by anxiety and emotional rhetoric. Indeed, the fear of Iraq’s disintegration and the rise of an independent Kurdish enclave in the north, inspiring or even assisting separatist sentiments in Turkey, have appeared to cloud the possibility of rational evaluation of the pros and cons of policy alternatives. As a result, the policy of projecting illegitimacy to the Kurdish Regional Government has cost Turkey a significant loss of clout not only in northern Iraq but also in the wider Iraqi political affairs, as Kurds have come to occupy significant positions in the central government as well.

Turkish policymakers exhibit a high degree of self-confidence and willingness to pursue intensive diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. Turkey pursues a multi-dimensional policy line to foster peace and stability in the region, and has already enjoyed some degree of success. Turkish policymakers seek to utilize Turkey’s good relations with Syria and Israel to wield an influence on these countries to facilitate Israeli-Syrian negotiations. The increasing level of trust to Turkey’s new image of civil-economic power in the Middle East and the U.S. support for Turkey’s potential contribution to chronic problems of the region have made Turkey a potential mediator in the decades-long Syrian-Israeli conflict.

2007 was no ordinary year for Turkey. Turkish democracy went through major trials. Turkish society became more confident in the exercise of its democratic rights. The Turkish economy continued to grow. Turkey became more active in regional politics. Stability and prosperity shifted the focus from narrow ideological debates to a larger vision for Turkey in the 21st century. But are any of these a guarantee for more progress in Turkey? To put it more bluntly, are the events of 2007 a temporary change of climate, or do they point to a deep-seated change in Turkish politics and society?

In an age of war on terror, Turkey pursues its own war against the escalating PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) terror. The dynamics that led to a parliamentary motion for a cross border operation into Northern Iraq will have implications for Turkey’s relations with Washington, Baghdad and other capitals in the region