Fanatism and Failing to Have Talks About Tutoring Centers

Frankly, the question is this: When is an attempt of seeking regulations on tutoring centers considered not as a “coup”?

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Fanatism and Failing to Have Talks About Tutoring Centers
The Diyarbakır Grafting in Politics

The Diyarbakır Grafting in Politics

The political performance presented in the Diyarbakır visit of Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdish Regional Administration in Northern Iraq, and of Erdoğan will create an effect of clearing the early reservations of the Kurdish Movement about the political ground and political strength of Erdoğan.

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It is impossible for the old tutelary foundation that is cemented by the Constitution to carry the emerging new edifice of Turkey.

Taha Özhan: Hosting Massoud Barzani in Diyarbakır is a significant turning point which has a consistent decade-old background history, and we may regard it as an ultimate-point for the state.

The AK Party was struggling to find a mid-way amid the red lines drawn by the three opposition parties. If getting rid of the Jacobean articles of the junta Constitution was not possible, then at least considerable effort was going to be exerted to subdue the emphasis on ethnicity in those articles.

Barzani, particularly for the last month, made his stance against PYD known. Not to mention, Barzani has been seizing on to a deep strategic alliance with Turkey in the recent years.

Politics, Not Arms, is the Way Forward for the Kurdish Issue

The Turkish-Kurdish peace process is facing challenges which can be ironed out only through politics not violence.

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Politics Not Arms is the Way Forward for the Kurdish
The Peace Process and the Enmity of Politics

The Peace Process and the Enmity of Politics

Unless the PKK perceives disarmament, not as leverage, but as the key to its own bargaining chip, it will not be able to achieve any founding political vision.

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As one Kurdish issue is being resolved, another is being created. The new Kurdish issue is nothing but “the PKK’s Kurdish issue.”

Both what the future democratization efforts entail and how expedient they will be depend, not on Erdoğan administration, but on the opposition. Unless the opposition makes a move soon, democratization in Turkey will have to come gradually in “mini democratization packages”.

In the multi-phased peace process, we face an entity that keeps employing unreasonable provocations in the “withdrawal” phase, the first leg of a road map on which their leader proceeds through consensus.

One should not expect a cure-all magic package but appreciate every single positive step because improvements take place through small steps extended over a period of time in Turkey.

In the last few years, the “Kurdish alienation” has deepened more with the cunning of the PKK-PYD and the support of the Arab nationalism that has risen in the region with the occupation of Iraq.

The Kurdish grassroots almost completely supporting the solution process of the Kurdish question will also question for how long , from here on, they will continue to bear with the Kurdish political elites who have difficulty to convey the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s message.

It is only through solution-oriented and new constitution-focused policies that the parties can carry out negotiations on the new constitution.

It is certain that the character assassination targeting PM Erdoğan through the Gezi Park protests does not expect to reach a conclusion right now. The aim of the character assassination is to obliterate Erdoğan’s decision-making capacity by 2015. At this point, Erdoğan’s leadership test begins.

Unlike what many suppose, democracy is a regime where conservative governments’ conservative policies do not constitute ground for accusations of authoritarianism.

What will shape politics and the society in Turkey from now on is not the identity of those who were in Taksim, but who they represented both qualitatively and quantitatively.