Conventional European pragmatism to conceptualize Turkey as a buffer zone to keep the troubles of the Middle East away from civilized Europe are bound to fail, as shown by the dramatic unveiling of the Paris attacks.

Recent years have made it clear that NATO is going through a transformation process; Turkey will be one of the allies most affected by this process. Both the future of NATO and Turkey’s perception of NATO membership will be at stake unless the allies can reach consensus on the core strategic issues of the transformation agenda. Analysts urgently need to come up with convincing answers to the following questions: In which ways has NATO’s transformation been going through? Why does Turkey feel uneasy with some aspects of the process? What steps should Turkey take in order to ensure that the transformation of the Alliance is viewed positively at home?

A few months before his death in October 2004, the famous French philosopher Jacques Derrida called for "deconstructing the European intellectual construction of Islam."

Turkey's relations with NATO in parallel to signs that the United States and the European Union have embarked on a process of greater transatlantic integration demands closer attention

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's walkout in the midst of a discussion on Gaza in Davos won him millions of supporters not only in Turkey, but around the world. With his bold position on the Middle East peace process, Erdoğan has the Arab and Muslim streets behind him. 

The birth pangs of a new human geography and geographic imagination are being felt across the Middle East. As the ethnic and sectarian models of cultural and political identities are being questioned, new patterns of cultural affinity and association are emerging with a new sense of shared history and common geography.         

The 2009 Gaza massacre is not the first incident where Israel has killed, pillaged and destroyed Palestinian lives. In 1982 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) under Ariel Sharon allowed the killing of more than 2,000 Palestinians in two Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila.  

There is a discrepancy and even contradiction between Turkey's foreign policy activism and the polarization of its domestic politics. While the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) keeps surprising everyone with its bold and decisive foreign policy moves, it is losing its grip on the domestic pulse.   

In the parliamentary elections of July 22, 2007, AKP (Justice and Development Party) won 47% of the votes, obtaining a very strong mandate to take issue with Turkey’s outstanding problems. In the predominantly Kurdish east and southeast region, the AKP doubled its vote from 26% to 53%. The AKP seemed to have persuaded the Kurds thanks to the party’s earlier moves to solve the Kurdish problem by granting more rights and freedoms as well as jobs and economic prosperity. Having started the negotiation process with the EU and obtaining such a strong mandate from the Kurdish voters, why did the AKP turn its back to the Kurdish issue?  This can be explained with reference to three groups of factors working at the domestic, the EU and international levels.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a Turkish world from the “Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall” became a new topic of discussion in Turkish policy circles. While Turkey tried to develop close political, economic and cultural relations with the newly independent Central Asian Republics, the mid and late 1990s witnessed a steady decline in the relations and failed to produce any concrete results. With its new foreign policy outlook, Turkey is seeking to increase its field of sphere in Central Asia by revitalizing its efforts to reconnect with the sister Turkish states. Security, economic cooperation, energy and civil society initiatives are the new dynamics of the Turkish-Central Asian relations.

<p>The EU progress reports on candidate countries are important indicators of how EU institutions manage and monitor the accession process.</p>