Türkiye has done is stop blocking NATO's extension of an invitation to the countries. In other words, their accession process has just started, not ended.

Türkiye emerges as a power that generates stability and security in its neighborhood – Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Gulf and North Africa.

In this collection of essays, we discuss how NATO can overcome strategic challenges and recalibrate the strength of the alliance under the new geopolitical circumstances. The essays in this report focus on NATO’s transformations after the Ukraine war and attempt to understand Türkiye’s foreign policy alternatives within the context of its relations with the West, Russia, and NATO.

This paper consists of two main parts. In the first part, it explains the main priorities that NATO is focusing on by elaborating on the Russian attack on Ukraine, the China challenge, and the changing character of military and non-military threats. In the second part, the paper delivers a framework to make sense of why Türkiye particularly attaches unique significance to some issues. It concludes that Türkiye will continue to support NATO endeavors but the country expects its allies to cooperate on counterterrorism efforts and also expects calibrated and meaningful engagement in Greek-Turkish disagreements.

The argument that Israel does not need to normalize its relations with Turkey, too, is quite weak. The Abraham Accords may have strengthened Tel Aviv’s hand, but a fresh nuclear deal between the United States and Iran stands to change the regional balance of power anew. In this sense, Israel would not want to be the last country to pursue normalization with Turkey.

In the post-pandemic order, Ankara seeks to explore new opportunities and find ways to reduce regional tensions

The UAE crown prince's visit has nudged progress to further decrease crises in the Middle East while also cementing bilateral relations

With different actors but the same agenda, there have always been figures in U.S. politics that aim to damage relations with Turkey. Robert Dole and Robert 'Bob' Menendez are two of them

On the eve of the meeting between Erdoğan and MBZ, questions about possible issues that may be discussed and the meeting’s impact on bilateral and regional affairs have been discussed in media debates. Given that, experts in the field have contemplated these questions and have provided their opinions regarding the meeting.

The idea of forming a new mechanism sounds logical for the NATO allies to thaw their frozen friendship

In today's global and regional developments, the Western world's otherizing and alienating of Turkey is nothing but an ideological blindness

Merkel’s last 16 years in office will be recorded in history as one of the most active periods in Turkish-German relations. Erdoğan and Merkel’s efforts to act as two rational actors on the axis of mutual interests became the main driving forces of this 16-year dynamism.

On October 31, 2021, during the G20 Summit in Rome, President Erdoğan is going to meet with U.S. President Biden. This will be their second meeting in a couple of months after Biden came to the White House.

Those 10 foreign ambassadors could serve their countries better if they stopped making such statements and instead promoted a new kind of relationship that recognizes Turkey’s interests and considerations.

The ambassadors chose the wrong path and attempted to interfere in Turkish domestic affairs. This is why Ankara's stance is right

Ankara should also continue its call for Athens to return to constructive neighborly relations and pave the path toward that direction.

Turkey has been enjoying good relations with three Gulf states – Qatar, Oman and Kuwait – for decades. However, Turkey’s relations with the other three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Saudi Arabia – worsened due to their conflicting perspectives toward the Arab insurgencies.