To continue our discussion from last week, Turkey's smart power is a strategic combination of soft and hard power, but the result is more than a plate of carrots and sticks.
Rather, it is the confluence and synthesis of strategic, historical and civilizational dynamics that distinguish Turkey from other regional and international powers. Joseph Nye's power analysis focuses on a crude cost-benefit framework and thus lacks in the strategic analysis of historical and civilizational dimensions. As it extends into various parts of the world, US power is bound to be constrained by the rough elements of international relations. The United States has never had strong historical and cultural ties with any major civilizational basin, and this is true even for Europe, from which it had originally sprung. The reason is that the US structure of power developed successfully to the extent to which it defined itself as distinct and separate from the historical rationality of Europe.
As far as US engagement in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America is concerned, a similar set of conditions have limited the US from nurturing deep historical, cultural and even religious ties with these areas. As a technological and military superpower, the US has remained aloof from all the major civilizational axes of world history and instead concentrated on amassing its power through a different kind of development: a highly creative culture of innovation, political sophistication and strategic expansion. Rather than dealing with deep-seated historical and cultural issues, the US power has made use of existing conflicts to open up a space for itself to maneuver geo-cultural and geo-political dynamics to its benefit. This policy more or less worked during the Cold War because the world needed a superpower that could claim to be above and beyond the "old conflicts" of the classical cultural and civilizational forces. But this very fact has also alienated the US from the rest of the world. Its expansionist policies are no longer seen as the justified acts of a benevolent imperial power. Even the fact that the US is one of the most dynamic and pluralistic societies in the world does not change this reality.
Countries like Turkey cannot afford to have a concept (or exercise) of power similar to that of the US. While in some ways the US power is an exception in the history of world powers, it also has some essential limitations that cannot be envied. In a speedily shrinking world, Turkey must develop its concept of power by carefully analyzing the context of its geo-cultural position and strategic alternatives. As in all cases of the smart use of power, Turkey must develop win-win scenarios for its regional partners and global actors.
Turning Turkey's historical depth and civilizational position into a strategic strength is not easy. In its troubled history of modernization, Turkey did many things right but also committed itself to some unsolvable and eventually futile dilemmas. The current tensions around Turkey's claims to be a secular state with a large Muslim population and what these two identity claims imply for domestic and regional policy limit Turkey's strategic choices and weaken its ability to mature a concept of smart power. Turkey must be strong and unified domestically to be effective regionally and internationally.
In this regard, we can speak about three concentric circles that would make up a workable notion of smart power for Turkey. Turkey must have a functioning democracy, a strong economy and a pluralistic concept of unity and solidarity. A rigid and dogmatic secularism that would land Turkey in the old-fashioned and discredited concepts of 19th century rationalism and positivism will only deepen the ideological divides and kill off all energy and enthusiasm for creativity and innovation.
On the regional scene, Turkey must prove useless and dysfunctional the old polarities of East and West or Islam and the West. Turkey's active engagement in its east and south (from Iran and Iraq to Syria,
