The July 15 coup attempt is one of the most important turning points in Türkiye’s recent history. The difference from previous coup attempts is that the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ), which masks itself as a civil society, was behind the coup, not just some soldiers. The coup plotters failed in this attempt, which led to the death of 252 innocent people, the injury of more than 2,000 people, and the bombing of the Parliament and Presidency buildings, as millions of people stood behind President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and took to the streets to confront the coup plotters. On July 15, immediately after one of the darkest nights in recent history, one of the brightest days dawned in Türkiye. This coup attempt paved the way for the restructuring of the domestic and foreign policies of the country.
The coup attempt had serious effects on the country’s domestic politics. First of all, afterward, the remnants of the military tutelage that had affected the country for decades were eliminated and the power of the civilian government was strengthened. In the words of President Turgut Özal, who fought against military tutelage in the 1980s, the fact that “those who elected” are superior to those who are appointed” principle was emphasized. At least it was shown to all relevant actors that a military coup cannot be carried out against the will of the people and that political power can only end with the will of the people.
Secondly, the presidential system was introduced to prevent the fragility of political actors and ensure political stability. Since overthrowing the executive branch, which is directly elected by the people, from power despite the will of the people means turning against the people, armed forces have to act more carefully.
Thirdly, after being rescued from the FETÖ members who infiltrated the state institutions as a “parallel state,” the state institutions in the country, especially security institutions, have gained a truly “national” character. After the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense, security was clearly divided into two different realms: internal and external. Accordingly, the armed forces and intelligence turned their attention to the external threats.
Fourthly, after the failed coup attempt and the purge of foreign elements from state institutions, the opportunity and possibility of external and foreign actors to intervene in Türkiye’s domestic politics has decreased significantly. It has been shown to external actors that they will no longer be able to design Turkish domestic politics the way they want. This increased the resilience of Turkish state institutions.
The July 15 coup attempt had similar effects on Turkish foreign policy. First of all, after the elimination of FETÖ elements, it became more possible for security institutions, whose capacities and capabilities increased, to conduct successful military operations at home and abroad. The Turkish government began to achieve greater success in combating direct and indirect threats and challenges to its political independence and territorial integrity. It started to take initiatives in foreign policy, such as in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and to use its hard power in foreign policy issues.
In addition, after the failed coup attempt, Türkiye significantly increased its strategic autonomy. Türkiye began to follow an Ankara-centered approach to foreign policy and decreased its dependence on foreign policy issues. Thus, July 15 became the symbol of Türkiye’s independent foreign policy orientation. Türkiye transformed its relations with the Western states from a traditional hierarchical perspective to a horizontal basis based on equal partnership. Türkiye became a state that primarily tries to maximize its own national interests. Thereupon, the Western states tried to further marginalize and alienate Türkiye. The Western states openly shelter and protect FETÖ members in their own country. In parallel, they mobilized all their resources in support of any anti-Turkish development.
However, the marginalization of Türkiye by some states triggered developments that led to the country becoming even stronger. Isolated by the West, Türkiye had to develop its defense industry. It expanded its relations into non-Western regions such as East Asia, Africa and Latin America. For example, after the U.S. and European countries declined to meet Türkiye’s demands, it purchased the S-400 air defense system from Russia. Similarly, after its allies declined to sell weapons systems to Türkiye, it began to produce at home and eventually emerged as an exporter country in the defense industry. In the end, the marginalization of Türkiye led to a high cost to Ankara but a higher cost for the Western states. Türkiye's determination to increase its strategic autonomy has made relations between Western countries and Türkiye increasingly tense.
As a result, the failed coup attempt of July 15, which brought Türkiye to the brink of collapse, provided the opportunity to restructure its domestic and foreign policy. Türkiye, which restructured its domestic politics and achieved political stability after the coup attempt, also strengthened its regional and global position. Post-July 15 developments have significantly contributed to the resilience of the Turkish state and nation. Both the Turkish state and the nation have become much more self-confident.
