Deepening Türkiye’s ties with those three Gulf states in trade, defense, technology, communication and security amounts to more than just reciprocal investments. After all, Türkiye has been gaining influence over the balance of power in that region. The country now seeks to form strategic alliances with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – as it did with Doha several years ago. It is also possible for other Gulf states to become part of that trend.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on Monday as part of his tour of the Gulf states. Over the course of four days, he will visit Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with a focus on investments and commercial relations. However, it is possible to argue that Erdoğan’s trip goes beyond strictly economic relations and marks the beginning of a new chapter in Türkiye’s relations with the Gulf.

Russia declaring the end of the grain agreement, the Prigozhin uprising, and the post-Vilnius Summit show that it wants the cards to be reshuffled. The Prigozhin uprising exposed weaknesses and rifts in the Russian military, resulting in a loss of political reputation for Putin. It has become clear that Russia cannot achieve a clear victory on the front lines in the near future. However, the slow progress of its counteroffensive indicates that Ukraine also cannot achieve a quick resolution. This balance situation indicates that the war could potentially extend over years, unless Putin makes a sudden decision to withdraw. It is known that the Russian military faces significant manpower and logistical challenges. In this scenario where military superiority is not attainable, we observe the use of asymmetric advantages such as the cancellation of the grain agreement.

Due to the lack of global leadership and the increase of uncertainties and insecurity in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar world and the Soviet Union, many small and middle states began to restructure their foreign policy orientation. The intensification of global rivalry, the increase of unilateral intervention and the return of power politics have led small and middle states to diversify their foreign relations and form regional political and economic platforms to overcome global threats and challenges.

It cannot be said that the efforts of Turkish foreign policy to open up space for itself through pragmatic steps in line with regional and global balances are adequately understood. Analyzes that depict Türkiye as "breaking away" from the Western alliance are based on the misconception that Türkiye cannot rationally determine its national interests and act accordingly. When every relationship President Erdogan develops beyond the Transatlantic alliance is presented as either an alternative to the West or a distancing from the West, unfounded prejudices about Türkiye's foreign policy emerge. As analyses of Türkiye are reduced to variations of the perception of a country caught between the West and the East, constantly experiencing ebb and flow, problematic perspectives on Turkish foreign policy become widespread. Unless it is based on the assumption that Türkiye has legitimate national interests and priorities, these analyses lose their ability to provide a profound explanation.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started a new debate ahead of this week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. Commenting on Sweden’s bid to join the Alliance, he argued that the relevant countries should “clear Türkiye’s path to European Union (EU) membership.” That statement aligned perfectly well with the readout of Erdoğan’s most recent phone call with U.S. President Joe Biden.

The Vilnius Summit is taking place at a time when the NATO alliance is beginning to overcome the strategic ambiguity it has experienced since the Cold War. Following the United States' declaration of a "war on global terrorism" after the September 11 attacks, NATO became involved in Afghanistan, but the alliance was unable to develop a strategy that aligned with the changing international security system. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept document mentioned cooperation with Russia but made no reference to the threat posed by China. Failing to provide a strong response to the annexation of Crimea, the alliance suddenly found itself facing the risk of nuclear war in Europe with Russia's attempted occupation of Ukraine. This development served as a reminder of NATO's core mission and highlighted the need for a complete reassessment of Europe's security. The alliance attempted to present a comprehensive vision against Russia, China, and other global threats in its 2022 Strategic Concept document.

Türkiye and its Western allies within the NATO alliance have been passing through a tense period due to the implications of the Russian-Ukrainian War that erupted in February 2022. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the European countries close to Russia have perceived a threat from Moscow. Therefore, large-scale measures were taken by these countries and their allies in the West. Within this context, the NATO alliance and its enlargement policy have come to prominence.