SETA PUBLIC LECTURE by Naser Elmanea, SRPR Date: February 28, 2011 Monday Time: 16.00 - 18.00 Venue: SETA, Ankara

Turkey’s mediation efforts in the most recent political crisis in Lebanon in January 2011 are driven by the assessment that a possible conflict would directly threaten Turkey’s interests.

Turkey can play a complimentary and even crucial role that could actually ease the task of the European Union between Serbia and Kosovo.

The unexpected switch of the CHP’s leadership from Deniz Baykal to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu led to a series of debates about the party’s political future and its new place in the party system of Turkey. Most of the debates have focused on what exactly changed and what remained the same as a result of this switch. Kılıçdaroğlu’s speeches revealed signs for new directions in CHP’s discourse indeed, as they included novel issues such as intra-party democracy and empowering the party’s women and youth branches. The purpose of this policy brief is to propose ideas to the CHP as a socialdemocratic party, so it can be a serious political alternative to the conservative AK Party. The CHP’s major target should be democratization to be achieved at two different levels: (a) institutional and (b) ideological. Institutional democratization requires establishing intra-party democracy, decentralization of power, as well as bringing ideological heterogeneity and political debates back to the party. Ideological democratization is about bringing ‘the left’ back to Turkish politics by embracing a progressive and social democratic discourse. This entails moving leftwards, a de-emphasis of nationalism and the adoption of a more egalitarian, less elitist, more libertarian, and more multiculturalist world vision.

President Abdullah Gül said it's a “historic opportunity” and called on everyone not to miss it. Prime Minister Erdoğan said “good things may happen.” Interior Minister Beşir Atalay confirmed that “some steps are being taken.” A few weeks earlier, the chief of general staff, İlker Başbuğ, outlined the military's vision on the problem and gave the most progressive speech by any top general.   

In a rather unprecedented cry of outrage, Prince Turki al-Faisal, one of the most prominent figures of the Saudi state, put it bluntly: If the US under the new Obama administration does not change its policy toward Israel and Palestine, the Saudis will no longer maintain their “special relationship” with the US (“Saudi Arabia’s patience is running out,” Financial Times, Jan. 23, 2009). Quoting from the Saudi king that his peace plan, called “the Arab peace initiative,” is still on the table, the prince added that “it would not remain there for long.” 

A new Pew report has brought alarming news: Anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim attitudes are on the rise in Europe. While the negative view of Muslims is higher than that of Jews, there is an interesting correlation between the two.

The excitement Turkey generates in the Arab world and beyond (the Balkans, Europe and parts of Africa can easily be added to the list) seems to be sustained by the confluence of substantial changes in three areas: Turkey, the region and the world.

In the parliamentary elections of July 22, 2007, AKP (Justice and Development Party) won 47% of the votes, obtaining a very strong mandate to take issue with Turkey’s outstanding problems. In the predominantly Kurdish east and southeast region, the AKP doubled its vote from 26% to 53%. The AKP seemed to have persuaded the Kurds thanks to the party’s earlier moves to solve the Kurdish problem by granting more rights and freedoms as well as jobs and economic prosperity. Having started the negotiation process with the EU and obtaining such a strong mandate from the Kurdish voters, why did the AKP turn its back to the Kurdish issue?  This can be explained with reference to three groups of factors working at the domestic, the EU and international levels.

This is the question everybody is seeking an answer for. The Bush administration thinks it knows what the power is for and Mr. Bush believes he is putting it to good use in Iraq, Afghanistan, potentially in Iran and elsewhere. But the hard realities of war and what is happening in the real world belie this false sense of confidence.