Erdoğan's victory on Aug. 10, despite serious attempts to undermine his administration, marks the beginning of a new era in Turkish politics.

The Turkish people not only elected Erdogan, but they also voted against the founding ideology of the Republic.

In the future, the 2014 presidential election in Turkey will serve as an oftencited example of the difference between political engineering and genuine politics.

There is less than a month to go before Turkey’s presidential elections but media is still not giving a clear view of vote

There are three presidential candidates, but actually only two of them are running and the other one keeps saying that "he will not be involved in politics."

Keeping all above-mentioned scenarios in mind, the only certain thing about the upcoming presidential election is that the main opposition CHP's decision to endorse a candidate with no ideological affinity to the party organization will result in a prolonged controversy.

A series of meetings, talks and statements since then, coupled with last weekend's workshop in Diyarbakır, indicate that the talks have either entered or are on the verge of a new stage.

The peace process has so far led the movement to prioritize political participation over armed struggle as part of a broader notion of seeking representation as a left party with ethnic overtones.

While no big surprises are expected from the local elections, the perception of success or failure of the ruling party will have an impact on its calculations with respect to the presidential election and the parliamentary election in 2015.

It is impossible for the old tutelary foundation that is cemented by the Constitution to carry the emerging new edifice of Turkey.

Barzani, particularly for the last month, made his stance against PYD known. Not to mention, Barzani has been seizing on to a deep strategic alliance with Turkey in the recent years.

The Turkish-Kurdish peace process is facing challenges which can be ironed out only through politics not violence.

The reshuffling of Turkey's domestic and foreign policy over the last decade has finally led to a solution for Kurds.

As the parties take a political-stress-test in the solution process, all of the actors who fail to play a founding-role will have to suffer structural fractures, independently of the survival or success of the process.

It seems that with the PKK’s disarmament these political positions will have to disarm politically.

The peace process will give us the opportunity to devise a more assertive and broader future by reconstructing a common “we” on a more righteous and healthier ground.

On Sunday September 12th, 2010, Turkey voted "yes" in a referendum to a package of amendments by a wide margin (58 percent yes; 42 percent no) with a high level of participation (77.5 percent) despite the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party's (BDP) boycott. The amendments were designed to restrict the power of the military and the judicial bureaucracy in Turkey that originated from the 1982 junta-made Turkish constitution. The immediate political consequence of the referendum will be a serious relaxation of domestic political tensions, which have been undergirded for over 50 years by the one constant in Turkish politics: the ever present threat of military coup.