Following Türkiye’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership in the Turkish Parliament, the U.S. State Department notified Congress of a $23 billion (TL 698.52 billion) sale of fighter jets to Türkiye and an $8.6 billion sale of advanced F-35 fighter jets to Greece, another ally in the NATO. The sale to Türkiye includes 40 Lockheed Martin F-16s and equipment to modernize the existing fleet of 79 F-16s. Greece will receive 40 F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters and related equipment.

As the municipal election campaign gained momentum with the unveiling of mayoral candidates and the fine-tuning of their campaigns, two major developments took place in foreign policy: the Turkish Parliament’s approval of Sweden’s NATO admission on Tuesday and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to the Turkish capital, where Türkiye and Iran signed 10 agreements.

After Sweden's NATO membership was approved in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), reports emerged that President Biden sent a letter to Congress seeking approval for the sale of F-16s. These developments indicate that we are nearing the conclusion of the long-debated F-16 issue. If the sale goes through, it could somewhat alleviate the deep-seated distrust that has plagued Turkish-American relations for some time. This distrust has made what should have been a routine arms deal between two NATO allies such a contentious process. Overcoming this hurdle would be beneficial for both countries, but it's still too early to declare the start of a new era. The potential sale of F-16s could pave the way for a new chapter by reducing mutual distrust.

The United States has been doing almost everything to otherize and alienate Türkiye throughout the last decade. The damaging steps taken by the last three U.S. governments, namely Barack Obama, Donald Trump and the current Joe Biden administrations, show that anti-Türkiye policy has become the state policy.

As uncertainty, competition and conflict gain momentum within the international system, Türkiye engages in diplomacy to play a more defining role in global and regional crises.

Describing 2023 as a relatively quiet year for Turkish foreign policy would exclude the events of Oct. 7 and their aftermath. The trend of normalization, ongoing since the general elections in May, played a pivotal role in determining the overarching course of foreign policy. Despite unresolved issues, emphasis was placed on minimizing potential conflicts and prioritizing common interests. In the post-election period, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan opted for a regional foreign policy centered on Gulf country relations, making the economy a primary focus. To mitigate security risks from Syria, ministerial-level talks with the Assad regime were initiated. Noteworthy strides were made in normalizing relations with Israel and Egypt. Erdoğan’s robust support for Azerbaijan in liberating Karabakh bolstered Türkiye’s status as a geopolitical player in 2023.

"There is no problem that cannot be solved between us," Erdogan told reporters as he met Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Athens on Thursday, adding that he wanted to turn "the Aegean into a sea of peace and cooperation".

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The political dynamics within the American Congress and the activities of lobbying groups have long been significant factors negatively impacting Turkish-American relations. Since the 1970s, Congress has constrained the broad authority of the White House in foreign policy, leading to decisions against Türkiye on issues such as Cyprus and Armenia. In recent years, Congress has extended its influence into areas like Syria and defense cooperation.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke with reporters covering his day trip to Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, where he attended the groundbreaking ceremony for the Iğdır-Nakhchivan Natural Gas Pipeline with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. His main remarks included the following:

Russia declaring the end of the grain agreement, the Prigozhin uprising, and the post-Vilnius Summit show that it wants the cards to be reshuffled. The Prigozhin uprising exposed weaknesses and rifts in the Russian military, resulting in a loss of political reputation for Putin. It has become clear that Russia cannot achieve a clear victory on the front lines in the near future. However, the slow progress of its counteroffensive indicates that Ukraine also cannot achieve a quick resolution. This balance situation indicates that the war could potentially extend over years, unless Putin makes a sudden decision to withdraw. It is known that the Russian military faces significant manpower and logistical challenges. In this scenario where military superiority is not attainable, we observe the use of asymmetric advantages such as the cancellation of the grain agreement.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan turned the question of Sweden’s NATO membership into an opportunity to start a new chapter in Türkiye’s relations with the West. Having hosted his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Istanbul ahead of the Vilnius summit and stating that Ukraine deserved to join the alliance, Erdoğan brought up the need to remove obstacles before his country’s European Union membership.

It cannot be said that the efforts of Turkish foreign policy to open up space for itself through pragmatic steps in line with regional and global balances are adequately understood. Analyzes that depict Türkiye as "breaking away" from the Western alliance are based on the misconception that Türkiye cannot rationally determine its national interests and act accordingly. When every relationship President Erdogan develops beyond the Transatlantic alliance is presented as either an alternative to the West or a distancing from the West, unfounded prejudices about Türkiye's foreign policy emerge. As analyses of Türkiye are reduced to variations of the perception of a country caught between the West and the East, constantly experiencing ebb and flow, problematic perspectives on Turkish foreign policy become widespread. Unless it is based on the assumption that Türkiye has legitimate national interests and priorities, these analyses lose their ability to provide a profound explanation.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan started a new debate ahead of this week’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. Commenting on Sweden’s bid to join the Alliance, he argued that the relevant countries should “clear Türkiye’s path to European Union (EU) membership.” That statement aligned perfectly well with the readout of Erdoğan’s most recent phone call with U.S. President Joe Biden.

The Vilnius Summit is taking place at a time when the NATO alliance is beginning to overcome the strategic ambiguity it has experienced since the Cold War. Following the United States' declaration of a "war on global terrorism" after the September 11 attacks, NATO became involved in Afghanistan, but the alliance was unable to develop a strategy that aligned with the changing international security system. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept document mentioned cooperation with Russia but made no reference to the threat posed by China. Failing to provide a strong response to the annexation of Crimea, the alliance suddenly found itself facing the risk of nuclear war in Europe with Russia's attempted occupation of Ukraine. This development served as a reminder of NATO's core mission and highlighted the need for a complete reassessment of Europe's security. The alliance attempted to present a comprehensive vision against Russia, China, and other global threats in its 2022 Strategic Concept document.

Türkiye and its Western allies within the NATO alliance have been passing through a tense period due to the implications of the Russian-Ukrainian War that erupted in February 2022. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the European countries close to Russia have perceived a threat from Moscow. Therefore, large-scale measures were taken by these countries and their allies in the West. Within this context, the NATO alliance and its enlargement policy have come to prominence.

Türkiye gained the world’s attention yet again – this time, due to its diplomatic activism. Ten days before the grain deal’s expiry, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in Istanbul. At the same time, diplomats and journalists continue to wonder whether Türkiye will approve Sweden’s NATO membership application ahead of the Vilnius Summit on July 11-12, 2023. Furthermore, Erdoğan is scheduled to visit the Gulf states on July 17-19 and host Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi on July 27.