Economic codes of the Feb 28 post-modern coup

During the four-year interlude that elapsed from Feb. 28, 1997 to 2001, fiscal discipline and financial prudence were completely lost, thereby preparing the groundwork for the gravest financial crisis in the country's history

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Economic codes of the Feb 28 post-modern coup
One Year On Economic Resistance to July 15

One Year On: Economic Resistance to July 15

Military interventions that interrupt the normal functioning of democratic regimes and utilize brutal military force to suppress legitimate political authorities and their support base open deep wounds in social fabrics.

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We can say that the organization enacted a three-stage plan on the night of July 15.

How was the coup attempt supposed to work? How did it fail? How did the process of fighting against the coup work?

The coup attempt was unorthodox because it was executed outside of the chain of command, i.e. not by orders from the central command of the Chief of Staff, but rather by military units controlled by Gülenist coup plotters from different divisions within the military

Turkish people from different political backgrounds, President Erdoğan and the government stood in harmony against those who wanted to establish a dictatorship through military power

Is Washington Aware of What Is to Come?

If Washington wants to protect the Turkey-U.S. alliance, it has to re-evaluate what happened on the night of July 15.

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Is Washington Aware of What Is to Come
The Turkish People Said 'Never Again'

The Turkish People Said 'Never Again'

It was a tragic night, it was a fateful night, it was a night that showed so many things about the Turkish people, their bravery, their dedication and commitment to democracy

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The reason behind the Feb. 28 post-modern coup, which was an outcome of the past military tutelage of politics, was economic

Turkey's relations with NATO in parallel to signs that the United States and the European Union have embarked on a process of greater transatlantic integration demands closer attention

Turkish-Russian relations have been transformed in a unique way since the late 1990s. Ever increasing economic relations have paved way for better political relations, bringing cooperation perspectives to fore while having competing agendas at the same time. The past several years witnessed confidence building between the countries as the relationship rose to the level of a multi-dimensional partnership; however, there are also ideational and material factors that limit Russian-Turkish partnership. The future of multi-dimensional partnership will largely depend on both countries’ ability to set a strong structural base for mutual and long-term beneficiary relationship.

Turkey’s rapid transition from a buffer state position to a pro-active and multi-dimensional diplomatic activism has led to ambiguities on the aim, intention and realism of the recent Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey and China have forged a good economic and political relationship in the current decade. Both countries provide great economic, political, and strategic opportunities for each other in their own regions. Turkey and China have forged a good economic and political relationship in the current decade. Both countries provide great economic, political, and strategic opportunities for each other in their own regions. Despite Ankara’s effort to push for a more integrated Uyghur community in Xinjiang under the Chinese Administration, the current difficulties transformed the issue into a problem area between China and Turkey. Turkey’s reiteration of its one-China policy may motivate China to display certain signs of improvement on the conditions of the Uyghur people. There is still considerable need to strengthen the relationship between Turkey and China and transform it into a strategic partnership. Realization of this prospect requires more systematic effort from both countries.

This article considers the August 2008 visit to Turkey by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and analyzes relations between Turkey and Iran in general. The tensions and crises that followed the 1979 Iranian Revolution are briefly presented in order to provide a better understanding of the present state of relations. Then we draw a picture of the situation after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, bringing widespread changes to Turkish foreign policy. We also call attention to Turkey’s changing role in the regional balance of power, and to the significance of that role both in Turkey’s relations with Iran and with the United States.

According to Louise Arbour, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, bigotry and prejudice against Muslims is increasing in Europe. Arbour made a call to all governments to take action against racism and discrimination towards Muslim communities. Arbour’s remarks are based on a recent study by Doudou Diene of Senegal.

Turkey has a unique experience in state formation, in formulating state-religion relations, but some painful periods in its history regarding democratization. The military intervention on Sept. 12, 1980 suspended Turkey's fragile democracy and caused a breakdown in party politics by banning all political parties and sending their leaders to trial. The first election after the military coup in 1983 was a turning point in Turkish political history, and the election results and subsequent government policies under Turgut Ozal's premiership changed the course of Turkish political culture for decades to come. Ozal's center-right liberal-conservative Motherland Party (then called ANAP, now ANAVATAN) launched a liberalization and democratization policy in Turkey, which facilitated the expression of Islam in the public sphere to a greater degree than before. As part of its policy, the government deleted Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Constitution to lift obstacles to freedom of thought. ANAP also adopted a free market economy through a large-scale privatization movement.

When Turkish-Israeli relations were formalized in March 28, 1949, Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognize the state of Israel; however, relations were kept at a minimum level for decades. From 1949 to the early 1990s, relations were very fragile and followed a fluctuating pattern. This pattern was replaced by the “honeymoon years” starting from the late 1990’s.

Since 2000, relations regained its historically fluctuating pattern and this continues to characterize the nature of relations between Turkey and Israel today. When Turkish-Israeli relations were formalized in March 28, 1949, Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognize the state of Israel; however, relations were kept at a minimum level for decades. From 1949 to the early 1990s, relations were very fragile and followed a fluctuating pattern. This pattern was replaced by the “honeymoon years” starting from the late 1990’s. The late 1990s marked by the soft coup of 1997, also known as the “February 28 Process,” constituted an exception in the pattern and level of relations between Turkey and Israel. Since 2000, relations regained its historically fluctuating pattern and this continues to characterize the nature of relations between Turkey and Israel today.

On Sunday September 12th, 2010, Turkey voted "yes" in a referendum to a package of amendments by a wide margin (58 percent yes; 42 percent no) with a high level of participation (77.5 percent) despite the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party's (BDP) boycott. The amendments were designed to restrict the power of the military and the judicial bureaucracy in Turkey that originated from the 1982 junta-made Turkish constitution. The immediate political consequence of the referendum will be a serious relaxation of domestic political tensions, which have been undergirded for over 50 years by the one constant in Turkish politics: the ever present threat of military coup.

Mr. Blix addressed the present challenges and opportunities on the way toward nuclear disarmament and peace in the world in general, in the Middle East in particular.