The revolution in Syria has achieved its goal, but everything is just beginning. The primary goal of the revolution was to topple the Assad regime. For 13 years, it came very close to toppling the regime from time to time, but what could not be achieved in 13 years was realized in 12 days, and the 61-year-old Baathist regime collapsed. The one responsible for 13 years of tears and bloodshed had to flee the country and seek refuge in Russia.
Much will be written about the revolution; many stories will be told. But the most important thing is how the future of Syria will be built from now on. Many dynamics will shape Syria’s future.
Internal dynamics
In terms of internal dynamics, the rapid collapse of the regime constitutes an important starting point. Given that the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) played a leading role in the overthrow of the regime, the transitional administration will also be dominated by the HTS. The peaceful transfer of power to the opposition by Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed Jalali, who remained the only symbolic representative of the regime in Damascus, ensured a relatively smooth start to the transition period. However, the top priority in Syria is to ensure security after the fall of the regime. To achieve full security, the military conflicts in the current controlled areas must be completely ended, and daily life must be made safe.
Given that the opposition controls more territory than it did during the revolution, ensuring security in Syria’s most populous cities, such as Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs, is critical for the transition. However, in critical cities such as Daraa, Suveyda, Latakia and Tartous, the primary issue for building a smooth transition is establishing a sustainable security environment. Consensus on the formation of a civilian government and the continued functioning of state institutions is also critical to the stability of the transition. However, Israel’s growing appetite for the Golan Heights, the ambiguous behavior of the U.S.-backed opposition, and the YPG/PKK’s opportunistic approach raise the possibility of a resumption of military conflicts. Even though Iranian-backed militias have left Syria, the possibility that they have left behind asymmetric elements also points to the fragile nature of the security environment.
Another important point to be considered alongside security is that the transitional government should develop and implement an inclusive governance model for Syria’s political reconstruction process. It is clear that the HTS has transformed itself. However, there are still divergent views on many issues within the new administration. At this point, coordination and coexistence between different groups are crucial. The consensus between the Syrian interim government, the HTS, and other groups in the transition process will be the most critical issue in the reconstruction process. It does not seem possible for the PKK/YPG to continue with a territorial claim in this transition process. At a time when the support of the U.S. is vital, the PKK/YPG’s continued position on maximalist demands will cause the transition process in Syria to be painful in the northeast of Syria. Building inclusiveness to keep ethnic and sectarian diversity together should be an indispensable criterion for the new era in Syria.
Political arrangements, which have many topics, can only be discussed during the transition period on a stable ground. These include the structure of the state, new security sector arrangements, power sharing, building a political system and free elections. Syria can only enter a democratic and conflict-free period in which the territorial integrity of Syria will be ensured if arrangements are made for governance and state structure that is not tied to territorial zones. The reconstruction of the security sector is among the most critical issues. Military groups must dissolve themselves and restructure under an interim defense ministry to be established in the coming period to eliminate potential conflicts.
Regional dynamics
For regional actors, Türkiye’s role has become even more important. It is not possible to understand Türkiye’s role by focusing only on the last 12 days. Türkiye’s role can be more clearly understood by looking at the past 13 years. Ankara’s unwavering hosting of Syrian refugees, creating the military and diplomatic conditions to protect Idlib against the regime’s operations, and limiting and weakening the YPG, especially in the fight against terrorism, made a strong ground for the opposition’s 12-day success.
Türkiye has a much more critical role to play in the new process. Türkiye is likely to lead efforts to stabilize northern Syria, secure its borders, and facilitate the return of refugees. Ankara’s ability to mediate and rebuild trust between the incoming government and the different factions will also help shape the political character of Syria’s future. If Türkiye succeeds in preventing YPG/PKK separatism, it could emerge as a dominant stabilizing force in the region. Another priority for Türkiye is to implement a multilateral method to shape regional and global diplomacy and ensure Syria’s territorial integrity. Ankara will continue to coordinate with Moscow and Tehran, even though Russia and Iran are much weakened in Syria.
One of the most critical regional actors in Syria is Israel. However, it is doubtful how much Israel wants to remain loyal to Syria’s territorial integrity. The reasons for this are obvious. Israel is keeping a Damascus-centered geopolitical narrative alive and is considering expansion into Syria. The creation of a new military situation in the Golan Heights is the most obvious evidence of this. The new government, which Netanyahu securitizes with the so-called radicals argument, also provides Israel with new legitimacy. The U.S.’ open support for Israel’s possible engagement in Syria also strengthens the possibility of Israel becoming a destabilizing actor in Syria. The only option to balance Israel is to keep the regional diplomacy dynamic against a possible fait accompli.
Iran’s position in the new Syria is highly questionable. Iran is aware that it is weakening and losing its depth in Lebanon and Syria. The collapse of the Syrian front, the most important pillar of the proxy doctrine based on territorial expansion and territorial control, may lead Iran to turn to asymmetric elements in Syria. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's framing of the opposition’s success as part of the U.S. and Israeli support is the most important sign of this.
It is clear that there is confusion in the Arab countries. It is understood that they will accept the new status quo even if they are not happy with the overthrow of the regime. The critical issue is to develop a new relationship model with Damascus to support the transition process and be part of the process to build a sustainable order in Syria. The way to do this is to work together with Türkiye to put maximum effort into building a stable Syria. At this point, the creation of a new diplomatic platform could be the first step toward coordination.
International dynamics
In the new era, the U.S. priorities in Syria include Israel’s security, the continued existence of the PKK/YPG and the fight against Daesh. The weakening influence of Russia and Iran may make it easier for the U.S. to accept the new status quo and cooperate with it. The current balance on the ground may also facilitate U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from Syria. Considering that the pre-Nov. 27 plans and possible scenarios no longer have any meaning for the Washington administration, we can say that the new Syria will not be seen as a priority for the U.S. in the Middle East. Still, it is worth being cautious. There are many opportunities for Türkiye and the U.S. to build a new Syria without the PKK/YPG. It is almost impossible for a strategy built on the PKK/YPG to work in the new Syria.
It is also clear that Russia is in the midst of a reassessment in Syria. Moscow has had to revise its priorities while analyzing the causes of the new situation. Russia will not have the same position in the new Syria as before, and the smartest approach is to focus on the political process and establish relations with the new administration. It is very likely to use U.N. Resolution 2254 and the Astana format to increase its diplomatic depth.
New era
The new Syria is one of the biggest geopolitical ruptures of the Arab Spring. The revolution has achieved its primary objective but establishing a new order in Syria is fraught with challenges. The lessons of Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia are fraught with political and social tragedy. Tunisia and Egypt chose to continue by building new authoritarianism on institutionalized systems. Yemen and Libya were not able to exit the process of political and military conflict over non-institutionalized structures, nor were they able to establish an order. Syria is an exception. It was a regime with a long civil war and a very different practice of institutionalization.
If those who succeeded in the revolution build a sustainable model and establish a new order in Syria, the new Syria has the opportunity to produce new results in the geopolitics of the Middle East. The only way to do this is to build a just, democratic and sustainable order. There is no model for this yet. And it will not be easy to build it.
