The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and PollMark recently conducted a fairly extensive and comprehensive study with the participation of 10,577 people in 2,497 different spots.

This article aims at presenting a descriptive account of the March 2009 local elections in Turkey. Comparing the general and local elections since 2004, an overall evaluation of trends in electoral preferences is presented. Using provincial general council election results, a detailed geographical comparative analysis of the 2004 and 2009 local elections is also carried out. The analyses show that the AKP’s rise has stalled but it still remains as the dominant power in the party system. The electoral map continues to be divided between the coastal western and most developed provinces where the opposition is significantly supported, the east and southeastern provinces where the Kurdish ethnic electoral support is rising and the more conservative provinces in between where the AKP continues to be dominant with the MHP trailing behind. Even though the March 2009 elections had all the characteristics of a local election, they also revel the rising trends in electoral behaviour in Turkey.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's walkout in the midst of a discussion on Gaza in Davos won him millions of supporters not only in Turkey, but around the world. With his bold position on the Middle East peace process, Erdoğan has the Arab and Muslim streets behind him. 

The birth pangs of a new human geography and geographic imagination are being felt across the Middle East. As the ethnic and sectarian models of cultural and political identities are being questioned, new patterns of cultural affinity and association are emerging with a new sense of shared history and common geography.         

After years of opposition and months of heated debate, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) began broadcasting in Kurdish today on TRT 6.  

I get this question all the time: how does Turkey do it? In international relations, Turkey wants to be a member of the European Union, continue its partnership with the US, have good relations with Russia and Iran, be fully involved in Iraq and the larger Middle East, increase its presence in the Balkans and central Asia and open up to Africa and Latin America. Domestically, Turkey wants to strengthen its democracy, improve its human rights record, continue its economic development, find a solution to the Kurdish problem and ease the tensions between religion and the Turkish state.  

The decision by the Turkish Constitutional Court to reject the closure case against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) opens a new chapter in the history of Turkish democracy.

Kosovo’s independence has revealed shifting strategic landscapes, security concerns and domestic developments in regional and international politics with significant implications for all actors in the region. Russia calculated to restore its lost ‘superpower’ status and control Serbia’s strategic oil industries. Turkey’s prompt recognition of independence increased its impact and prevented a stronger Greek-Serb-Russian axis in the region, while strengthening its Western identity.  Kosovo’s independence will be a test case for keeping peace and stability in the Balkans within the new dynamics of regional and international politics.

2007 was no ordinary year for Turkey. Turkish democracy went through major trials. Turkish society became more confident in the exercise of its democratic rights. The Turkish economy continued to grow. Turkey became more active in regional politics. Stability and prosperity shifted the focus from narrow ideological debates to a larger vision for Turkey in the 21st century. But are any of these a guarantee for more progress in Turkey? To put it more bluntly, are the events of 2007 a temporary change of climate, or do they point to a deep-seated change in Turkish politics and society?

In one of his farewell speeches the outgoing Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer reiterated his belief that the regime in Turkey is in danger. He thinks that if Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan becomes president the secular principles of the republic will be jeopardized. President Sezer is not alone in this.

Masud Barzani’s recent statements about Kirkuk are nothing new. We have heard other passionate statements from him before. What is new is the comparison between Kirkuk and Diyarbakir. This is something that will be talked about for years to come.Apparently, Mr. Barzani made this statement during an interview with al-Arabiyyah TV back in January 26, 2007. The Turkish government is in shock, and for a good reason.

The picture was clear and symbolic: on the EU’s 50th birthday German Chancellor Angela Merkel presented as a gift to French President Jacques Chirac a cup with a depiction of Napoleon’s invasion of Alexandria in 1798. Never mind that Turkey, as a candidate country, has not been invited to the party. Never mind either the fact that the current EU president, Merkel, has nothing to hide in her opposition to EU’s membership.

Turkish politics is stuck on the question of who should become the next president of Turkey. The more Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan avoids talking about it, the more aggressive the opposition becomes. It is not only the opposition parties that are stuck on the question. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) cadres are in no better a position. No one dares speak about the new president. From the heavyweights to the ordinary supporters of the AK Party, they all say the same thing: if Erdoğan wants it, he should get it because he deserves it. No other presidential election in recent memory, with the exception of that of Turgut Özal, has been as hotly debated as this one.

We’re only five weeks away from April 16, when the candidates for the new president of Turkey will be announced. According to the rules, the new president has to be elected within 10 days of April 16. While the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) continues to keep silent on its name(s), the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) is moving ahead under the assumption that Recep Tayyip Erdogan will have himself elected president.

In no period of recorded history have human beings known about different cultures as much as we do. Thanks to the pervasive nature of globalization, what happens in Washington, London or France has an immediate impact on what positions are taken in Istanbul, Cairo or Kuala Lumpur. Our global public space is so powerful yet also so elusive that it leads many to believe that more information brings more understanding. Getting to know each other from close up, however, is not always a smooth and easy experience. It may result in some pleasant surprises and enriching experiences. Yet it may also result in disappointment, frustration and mistrust. In the current state of relations between Muslim and Western societies, we are doomed when we refuse to recognize each other in one way or another. Yet, we also run up against tremendous difficulties when we show the courage and honesty of knowing each other closely for there is too long a history of doubt, mistrust and refusal.

What do Turks in Europe think about the European Union identity? How do they define the EU? How do they see the image of Turkey in Europe? How far do they support Turkey's EU membership? Are they prepared to contribute to Turkey's efforts for full membership? This article will address such questions based on research findings surveying 100 Turkish civil associations in the Netherlands.