What Putin and the Kremlin elite have to clearly understand is that Turkey is not at all helpless against Russian bullying, on the contrary, it could employ numerous alternative options to fill the vacuum that will be created by the Russian absence in its diplomatic and economic network.

Who lost the Syrian civil war to Russia? Who rolled out the red carpet leading to the Middle East to the Kremlin?

Turkey might play a role in reintegrating the Iranian state into the international system. Turkey’s initiatives may have a moderating influence on the Iranian state and would, in any case, be a better policy route to choose rather than a direct confrontation.Turkey might play a role in reintegrating the Iranian state into the international system. Turkey’s initiatives may have a moderating influence on the Iranian state and would, in any case, be a better policy route to choose rather than a direct confrontation. It is a good sign for Iran and Turkey that the volume of trade between the two countries increased from $1.3 billion in 2002 to $10 billion in 2008. Iran is also be seen as a natural gateway by the Turkish state in order to reach into the markets of Central Asia and Pakistan. These kinds of Turkish political and economic initiatives will not only serve the interests of the Turkish and Iranian states but also have the potential to replace the aggressive military rhetoric of Western countries in dealing with Iran if the ultimate aim is to re-include Iran into the world economy and moderate its behavior. In addition, a more peaceful future for Iraq depends on reintegrating Iran with the rest of the world. Hence, the wiser course of action for western countries is to follow the Turkish example of engagement with Iran using diplomacy rather than issuing military and economic threats

Recent years have made it clear that NATO is going through a transformation process; Turkey will be one of the allies most affected by this process. Both the future of NATO and Turkey’s perception of NATO membership will be at stake unless the allies can reach consensus on the core strategic issues of the transformation agenda. Analysts urgently need to come up with convincing answers to the following questions: In which ways has NATO’s transformation been going through? Why does Turkey feel uneasy with some aspects of the process? What steps should Turkey take in order to ensure that the transformation of the Alliance is viewed positively at home?

Turkey's relations with NATO in parallel to signs that the United States and the European Union have embarked on a process of greater transatlantic integration demands closer attention

Can the Turkish military be democratic? This is a crucial question for Turkish democracy and by extension for a number of chronic problems which have plagued Turkish society for decades

Joe Biden was selected as Barack Obama’s vice presidential candidate largely because of his expertise in foreign policy.  Traditionally, in U.S. politics, Dick Cheney-like strong vice presidents are exception, not the rule. It is wiser to focus on Obama’s foreign policy outlook rather than Biden’s, which would benefit Turkey in the long run with its realistic tendencies. Biden’s voting pattern, as it is displayed in three different issues (Cyprus-Armenian Issue-Iraq) does not seem friendly to the Turkish position. However, Biden as a statesman would not create extra problems for Turkey at the expense of U.S national interests. In all of these issues, the person that should be watched carefully is Obama, not Biden. Spending more energy to analyze Obama’s geopolitical priorities can benefit Turkey in the long run.

Turkey has been involved, historically and demographically, with many of the regions of “frozen conflict” in post-Soviet space. At this point, one might consider the position of Turkey as being at the epicenter of Euro-Atlantic and Russian extremes concerning the frozen conflicts. Georgia, since 1991, has been considered a valuable “strategic partner” by Turkey for several reasons. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s Caucasus Pact idea is a good opportunity to create an inclusive (Russia+Turkey+Georgia+Armenia+Azerbaijan) new foreign policy approach at this stage. This approach should be merged with the representation of all the frozen or unfrozen conflict areas, peoples, ethnic groups and regions included under the roof of such an alliance.

Currently, GAP is a regional development project that covers nine southeastern provinces extending over the wide plains in the basins of the lower Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Political and economical instability in Turkey in the 1980s diverted attention from the GAP Project and led to consecutive failures in meeting official targets for its progress within the initial time framework. Within the last five years,  

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a Turkish world from the “Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall” became a new topic of discussion in Turkish policy circles. While Turkey tried to develop close political, economic and cultural relations with the newly independent Central Asian Republics, the mid and late 1990s witnessed a steady decline in the relations and failed to produce any concrete results. With its new foreign policy outlook, Turkey is seeking to increase its field of sphere in Central Asia by revitalizing its efforts to reconnect with the sister Turkish states. Security, economic cooperation, energy and civil society initiatives are the new dynamics of the Turkish-Central Asian relations.