On July 13, 2009, an intergovernmental accord on the proposed Nabucco gas pipeline was signed. The 3.300 kilometer long pipeline will transport Caspian, Iraqi and likely Iranian gas in the future depending on the changing situation and its relationship with the USA, and to a lesser extent Egyptian natural gas resources, via Turkey to Austria. The Turkish leg of the pipeline will be 2000 kilometers long.Given that the pipeline is designed to export non-Russian Caspian resources – Azeri, Kazakh, and Turkmeni - to European markets, thereby, diversifying energy supplies for western energy markets, several European states and the US have supported this project. The project is planned to become operational in 2014 with an estimated cost of 7.9 billion euros (10.6 billion dollars). In addition to enhancing its energy corridor role, the pipeline will provide significant benefits to Turkey in terms of revenues, employment, etc.

After years of opposition and months of heated debate, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) began broadcasting in Kurdish today on TRT 6.  

I get this question all the time: how does Turkey do it? In international relations, Turkey wants to be a member of the European Union, continue its partnership with the US, have good relations with Russia and Iran, be fully involved in Iraq and the larger Middle East, increase its presence in the Balkans and central Asia and open up to Africa and Latin America. Domestically, Turkey wants to strengthen its democracy, improve its human rights record, continue its economic development, find a solution to the Kurdish problem and ease the tensions between religion and the Turkish state.  

A recent poll by Pollmark, presented at the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) think tank in Ankara, shows that terrorism is the number-one problem for many in Turkey.  

It may look like a paradox, but the current standoff between Turkey and northern Iraq could turn into an opportunity to solve the Kurdish problem in Turkey and the region. Turkey's increased efforts to fight Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism has the full backing of all the related actors: the Turkish public, the political establishment, security elites, regional actors and international public opinion. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government should seize this opportunity and start a process of national reconciliation and healing.  

Less than one week ahead of the US presidential election, Turkish-US relations and Turkey's role in its neighboring regions were the subject of a one-day conference organized by the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research and the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.

How much can an election reveal the deeper issues dividing a country? Certainly, the 2008 US elections are putting out so much about the vices and virtues of American society that a close examination of certain trends and discourses over the last three months can save you years of arduous study at a serious academic institution.

The rise to power of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan marks a new era in positive Turkish-Syrian relations. The new Syrian attitude towards Turkey represents a break from past: Syria considers Turkey a reliable partner for brokering a peace deal between Syria and Israel, and Turkey offers opportunities for political and economic cooperation for improving the welfare and security of two countries. The Syrian administration considers Turkey’s partnership to be a key factor in its attempts to achieve integration into the international community, a solution of the problems with Israel, and the securing of territorial unity in Iraq.

Speaking to Milliyet columnist Fikret Bila, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that Turkey is being forced to take sides in the Georgian conflict.

Writing forty years ago in the "Journal of Contemporary History" Andrew Mango, the prominent British historian of modern Turkey, noted Turkey's potential new role in the Middle East as a "middle-power." He observed that "Turkey is socially and technologically the most advanced country of the Muslim Middle East.

Perhaps the most consequential and drastic decision in Turkish foreign policy in recent months was to engage in direct negotiations with Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. This is significant because, since the onset of Iraq War in 2003, Turkey has sought to ignore or marginalize Iraqi Kurds, and has refrained from all acts that could be viewed as concessions or de facto recognition. Although the Iraqi Kurdish leadership has received red-carpet ceremony in Ankara in the1990s, Turkish foreign policy toward northern Iraq, since the war, has been stymied by anxiety and emotional rhetoric. Indeed, the fear of Iraq’s disintegration and the rise of an independent Kurdish enclave in the north, inspiring or even assisting separatist sentiments in Turkey, have appeared to cloud the possibility of rational evaluation of the pros and cons of policy alternatives. As a result, the policy of projecting illegitimacy to the Kurdish Regional Government has cost Turkey a significant loss of clout not only in northern Iraq but also in the wider Iraqi political affairs, as Kurds have come to occupy significant positions in the central government as well.

The escalation in attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) on Turkish troops and civilians has brought Turkey to the brink of war with the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish prime minister, has declared that unless action is taken against the PKK, Turkey will act unilaterally. Despite the intensifying rhetoric, however, the crisis may be an opportunity to find a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey and the region

The referendum on Oct. 21 was held under the shadow of terrorist attacks. The news of the bombing of a bridge in Daglica, Hakkari and the death of 12 soldiers began to arrive in the early hours of Sunday.

The details of Hrant Dink’s assassination are frightening. Not because they reveal an underground gang or a secret terrorist organization but because they are so ordinary. Ogun Samast, the assassin, is a 17-year-old youth from Trabzon.  He is described by his family and friends as somewhat angry and temperamental. He played soccer in an amateur club. His school record is not bright. He smokes. He socializes with his friends. He has a family. And he is 17 years old.All of these details lead us not to a monstrous killer but to an average person. And this is what is scary about the whole crime.

The carnage in Iraq is continuing without lessening. The slaughter has neither direction nor meaning. No one can even name what is happening: is it a civil war? Resistance? Sectarian violence? Insurgency? A proxy war? Now both Americans and Iraqi leaders admit they cannot control the situation. The new Bush plan to send 21,500 new American troops to Baghdad is unlikely to stop the bloodshed. It will only increase the suspicion that Americans have no intentions of leaving Iraq or giving a timetable for withdrawal. In turn, this will only further weaken the already weak Maliki government, which is in the process of forming a new cabinet.